Forcible Transborder Abduction: Defensive Versus Offensive Remedies for Alvarez-Machain by Baker, Ashley Wright
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 48 
Number 4 Teaching Criminal Law (Summer 
2004) 
Article 18 
10-15-2004 
Forcible Transborder Abduction: Defensive Versus Offensive 
Remedies for Alvarez-Machain 
Ashley Wright Baker 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ashley W. Baker, Forcible Transborder Abduction: Defensive Versus Offensive Remedies for Alvarez-
Machain, 48 St. Louis U. L.J. (2004). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol48/iss4/18 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more information, 
please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
1373 
FORCIBLE TRANSBORDER ABDUCTION: DEFENSIVE VERSUS 
OFFENSIVE REMEDIES FOR ALVAREZ-MACHAIN 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following scenario: You are sitting in your office steadfastly 
working when armed gunmen burst in, kidnap you, and place you on an 
airplane bound for Tijuana, Mexico, where they will hand you over to Mexican 
officials.  Upon arrival in Mexico, the court refuses to dismiss the indictment 
even though the abduction violates the United States’ territorial sovereignty, 
your personal rights, and international law.  After the criminal case, 
nonetheless, you might be granted an offensive remedy in which you can sue 
your abductors and the Mexican government.1  It sounds extraordinary, but the 
U.S. Supreme Court, along with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, has 
effectively condoned this exact conduct—although in the reverse situation—
throughout the various stages of United States v. Alvarez-Machain.2  This 
 
 1. Several commentators have recognized the possibility of a reciprocal effect of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Alvarez-Machain, which condoned forcible transborder abductions.  
One observed that “[t]he Court may not have considered the possible reciprocity of its decision 
compelling.  By subjecting foreign nationals to the vagaries of United States Government 
abduction, the Court has diminished the protections of United States citizens.”  David Ring, Note 
and Comment, United States v. Alvarez-Machain: Literalism, Expediency and the “New World 
Order,” 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 495, 532 (1994); see also Michael R. Wing, Extradition Treaties—
International Law—The United States Supreme Court Approves Extraterritorial Abduction of 
Foreign Criminals—United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. 2188 (1992), 23 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 435, 457-58 (1993).  In a proposed Senate Resolution, Senator Moynihan also 
acknowledged the possibility of U.S. citizens being kidnapped: 
[T]here are terrorists the world over prepared to see Americans killed, and we have 
legitimated the proposition that a foreign government can send agents into this country or 
find agents in this country which will take Americans out of the jurisdiction, leave them 
defenseless in foreign lands, and they will say to us, “You did it, and we are doing it.  
What is the difference?” 
S. Res. 319, 102d Cong. (1992). 
 2. 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (holding that the district court had jurisdiction to try a Mexican 
national who was forcibly abducted and brought to the United States); Alvarez-Machain v. United 
States, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that Alvarez-Machain had offensive 
remedies available under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act).  
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if the Supreme Court will sustain the right to an offensive 
remedy.  The Court accepted certiorari in December 2003 and will hear the cases in Spring 2004.  
United States. v. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 821 
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disturbing situation has occurred because the courts first legitimized 
transborder abductions as a means to apprehend a suspect and then offered an 
after-the-fact monetary remedy to the victim. 
Throughout history, the United States has used varying forms of irregular 
rendition to bring foreign criminal defendants into the United States to stand 
trial.3  Such abductions occur outside the contours of any existing extradition 
treaty between the nation states.  This has caused an outcry from the 
international community in certain circumstances.  Although abduction might 
be a somewhat efficient way to bring criminals to justice, it violates a nation’s 
territorial sovereignty, the victim’s personal rights, and the integrity of the 
international legal process.  In addition, transborder abductions affect the 
abducting state’s reputation in the international community because such 
abductions transgress the formal extradition process.  The practice of 
transborder abductions represents a great paradox in U.S. foreign policy 
because the United States makes all attempts to stop the abduction of its own 
citizens yet excuses the use of kidnapping to accomplish its own goals.4 
Despite the negative implications, the United States Supreme Court has 
upheld in personam jurisdiction and the legality of transborder abductions 
through the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.5  Through this controversial doctrine, courts 
 
(Dec. 1, 2003) (No. 03-485); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. 
granted, 124 S.Ct. 807 (Dec. 1, 2003) (No. 03-339). 
 3. Professor Bassiouni explains that there are two categories of irregular rendition: 
(1) abduction of a person by the agents of a state other than the one in which he is present, 
with or without the knowledge or consent of the state of refuge; and 
(2) seizure of a person by the agents of the state where he is present and his surrender to 
the agents of another state outside of formal or legal process. 
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 
249 (4th ed. 2002). 
 4. Even a Legal Advisor to the State Department acknowledged the paradoxical nature of 
the United States position regarding transborder abductions: “[H]ow would we feel if some 
foreign nation . . . came over here and seized some terrorist suspect in New York City . . . because 
we refused through the normal channels of international, legal communications, to extradite that 
individual?”  Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 679 n.21 (1992).  A Senate Resolution proposed by 
Senator Moynihan recognized this absurdity after the Alvarez-Machain decision: 
  Whereas, as a result of certain actions taken by United States officials and the recent 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Alvarez-
Machain other nations may believe that the United States accepts the international legality 
of kidnapping; 
. . . 
be it [r]esolved by the Senate, that: (1) Anyone who attempts to kidnap a person in the 
United States for the purpose of bringing that person to trial abroad should be deemed to 
have committed a crime in the United States and dealt with accordingly . . . . 
S. Res. 310, 102d Cong. (1992). 
 5. The principle is embodied in two Supreme Court cases: Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 
(1886) and Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).  Frisbie can be distinguished from Alvarez-
Machain as it was a domestic kidnapping case in which a suspect was abducted by Michigan 
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have jurisdiction over a defendant regardless of how he was brought before the 
court.6  In United States v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court applied the Ker-Frisbie 
doctrine in the strictest sense and condoned forcible transborder abductions as 
a means to gain custody of a suspect even when an extradition treaty exists 
between the countries.7 
The decision caused outrage throughout much of the international 
community for a multitude of reasons.8  Many nations feared that their 
nationals would be kidnapped by the United States and felt that such unilateral 
action violated their territorial sovereignty.9  The Alvarez-Machain decision 
was also condemned because the Supreme Court simply dismissed the 
contention that international law might prohibit such unilateral state action.  
Nonetheless, most of the criticisms revolved around the fact that the United 
States domestic legal system should have provided a defensive remedy for 
Alvarez-Machain by dismissing the indictment.  Rather than dismissing the 
indictment, however, the U.S. court system has provided him with an after-the-
fact monetary remedy. 
A defensive remedy, essentially dismissal of the indictment, maintains the 
highest level of judicial integrity, deters future government misconduct, and 
compensates the victim by restoring the victim’s liberty and freedom.  On the 
other hand, an offensive remedy, when not coupled with a defensive remedy, 
effectively condones government misconduct, as it allows the government to 
keep the fruits of its illegality, and cannot restore a victim’s intangible rights.  
The purpose of this Note, therefore, is to show that a case against an abducted 
individual should be dismissed and the individual should be repatriated to his 
or her home State because dismissal is the only appropriate and adequate 
remedy to restore the victim to the status quo ante. 
Part II of this Note reviews the history of the Alvarez-Machain case, which 
began in 1990.  It discusses the background facts of the case, the criminal case, 
and the civil case up to this point in 2004.  Part III considers the international 
community’s response to forcible transborder abductions and the appropriate 
 
officials in the state of Illinois.  Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 520.  Ker, on the other hand, involved the 
abduction of the suspect from Peru to the United States; the difference between Ker and Alvarez-
Machain is that the kidnapper was acting “without any pretence of authority under the treaty or 
from the government of the United States.”  Ker, 119 U.S. at 443.  As John Kester observed when 
describing the doctrine, “[b]ecause lawyers have found this canard so intriguing and memorable, 
it often slips into judicial decisions.  That should not be allowed to continue.”  John G. Kester, 
Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1449-50 (1988) (footnote 
omitted). 
 6. Ker, 119 U.S. at 440-44; Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522. 
 7. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 657-62. 
 8. For example, the United Nations and the Organization of American States both 
condemned the decision.  See infra Part III.A. 
 9. Many governments expressly condemned the decision and stated that a kidnapping of 
their national would be viewed as a criminal act.  See infra Part III.B. 
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remedy under international law.  Part IV examines the possible defensive and 
offensive remedies available to an abducted individual.  Specifically, it 
explores dismissal of the indictment, the exclusionary rule, the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, and the Federal Tort Claims Act.  Part V evaluates policy 
objectives announced in various U.S. Supreme Court decisions, such as 
judicial integrity, deterrence of government misconduct, and victim 
compensation.  It also rebuts the two main objections to providing a defensive 
remedy: (1) that it undermines effective law enforcement and (2) that the 
judiciary should not involve itself in matters concerning international relations 
and political questions. 
II.  HISTORY OF THE ALVAREZ-MACHAIN CASE 
There are several background facts that must first be established before 
discussion of the Alvarez-Machain case.  First, there was a significant increase 
within the United States’ borders in drug trafficking operations by Mexican 
cartels in the 1980s.10  This, in turn, caused the United States to launch its so-
called War on Drugs.11  As a result of the Mexican cartels and the War on 
Drugs, the United States began placing D.E.A. (Drug Enforcement Agency) 
agents in Mexico to help eradicate the cartels and their plantations.  In addition 
to these factors, there has also been an increase in terrorism in the United 
States in the past decade, which has caused the government to take 
extraordinary measures, in some circumstances, to bring criminals to justice.  
As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted, “[i]n the midst of contemporary 
anxiety about the struggle against global terrorism, there is a natural concern 
about the reach and limitations of our political branches in bringing 
international criminals to justice.”12 
A. Background Facts 
Enrique Camarena-Salazar was a D.E.A. agent who was assigned to 
Mexico to bring Mexican drug traffickers to justice and to identify political 
corruption within the Mexican drug program.13  He played a role in the 
eradication of several marijuana plantations.  As a result of his involvement in 
 
 10. William J. Aceves, The Legality of Transborder Abductions: A Study of United States v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 3 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 101, 104 (1996). 
 11. Melanie R. Hallums, Note, Bolivia and Coca: Law, Policy, and Drug Control, 30 VAND. 
J. OF TRANSNAT’L. L. 817, 835 (1997).  In 1973, President Nixon proclaimed an “all-out, global 
war on the drug menace.”  Steven B. Duke, Drug Prohibition: An Unnatural Disaster, 27 CONN. 
L. REV. 571, 574 (1995) (quoting the President’s Message to Congress Transmitting 
Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, Establishing a Drug Enforcement Administration, H.R. Doc. 
No. 69 (1973)).  Despite the professed War on Drugs, the market for illegal drugs has 
substantially increased in the United States and throughout the world.  Hallums, supra at 819. 
 12. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 13. Aceves, supra note 10, at 104-05. 
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these efforts, Camarena was kidnapped by Mexican drug traffickers outside the 
American consulate in Guadalajara, Mexico on February 7, 1985.14  Camarena 
was subsequently taken to a house where he was tortured, interrogated, and 
eventually murdered.15  He was repeatedly revived throughout the torture so 
that the interrogation and torture could continue.16  Camarena’s body was 
found a month later with that of a Mexican pilot who had assisted him in aerial 
reconnaissance of marijuana fields in Mexico.17 
Following the discovery of Camarena’s body, the D.E.A. and the Mexican 
government separately initiated operations to investigate his murder and bring 
the people responsible for his death to justice.18  Although twenty-eight 
Mexican nationals were convicted in Mexico for their involvement in 
Camarena’s murder, not all suspects were detained.  One of those released was 
Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain.19  The United States had received information 
that Alvarez-Machain administered lidocaine to Camarena in order to revive 
him throughout his torture and interrogation.20 
An indictment was issued on January 31, 1990 in the U.S. District Court 
for the Central District of California that charged Alvarez-Machain, along with 
other Mexican nationals, with federal crimes relating to the Camarena 
murder.21  Nevertheless, the United States never made any attempt to formally 
extradite Alvarez-Machain.  Rather, the D.E.A. initiated informal negotiations 
with several Mexican officials to abduct and bring him into the United States. 
Specifically, the D.E.A. offered a $50,000 reward and expenses to deliver 
Alvarez-Machain.22 
Alvarez-Machain was kidnapped by “[f]ive or six armed men” from his 
office in Guadalajara by Mexican nationals on April 2, 1990.23  He was held 
for approximately twenty hours in Mexico, where he was physically and 
verbally abused before being handed over to the D.E.A. in El Paso, Texas.24  
 
 14. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 601-02 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff’d sub 
nom. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d sub nom. United 
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 665 (1992). 
 15. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 609. 
 16. See Jim Newton, Camarena’s Abduction and Torture Described; Courts: Former 
Bodyguard Says Ranking Mexican Officials were at the House Where U.S. Drug Agent was 
Killed,  L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1992, at B1. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Aceves, supra note 10, at 105. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 105-06. 
 21. Id. 
 22. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 602 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff’d sub nom. 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d sub nom. United States 
v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 665 (1992). 
 23. Id. at 603. 
 24. Aceves, supra note 10, at 107. 
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Alvarez-Machain testified that he was “shocked six or seven times through the 
soles of his shoes with . . . ‘an electric shock apparatus’. . . [and] injected twice 
with a substance that made him feel ‘light-headed and dizzy.’”25  After 
receiving medical treatment in El Paso for one week, he was transferred to Los 
Angeles for arraignment before the U.S. District Court for the Central District 
of California.26 
B. Procedural History of Alvarez-Machain 
1. The Criminal Case 
Alvarez-Machain filed a motion to dismiss in the district court for lack of 
personal jurisdiction and outrageous government conduct.27  Relying on the 
Ker-Frisbie doctrine, the court rejected his due process claim, stating that “the 
Supreme Court established the long standing rule of law that a forcible 
abduction does not offend due process and does not require that a court dismiss 
an indictment for the loss of jurisdiction on those grounds.”28  Nevertheless, 
the court found merit in Alvarez-Machain’s argument that his forcible 
abduction violated the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty.29  The district 
 
 25. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 603. 
 26. Aceves, supra note 10, at 108. 
 27. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 601. 
 28. Id. at 604.  The court did note that exceptions to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine had been 
allowed when the defendant could establish government conduct “of the most shocking and 
outrageous kind.”  Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65-66 (2d Cir. 
1975).  However, Alvarez-Machain failed to show this type of abuse because he never reported 
any type of mistreatment to the doctors that examined him upon arrival in El Paso.  Id. at 605-06. 
 29. Treaty of Extradition Between United States of America and the United Mexican States, 
May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059 [hereinafter Extradition Treaty].  The Extradition 
provides that: 
1. - The Contracting Parties agree to mutually extradite, subject to the provisions of this 
Treaty, persons who the competent authorities of the requesting Party have charged with 
an offense or have found guilty of committing an offense, or are wanted by said 
authorities to complete a judicially pronounced penalty of deprivation of liberty for an 
offense committed within the territory of the requesting Party. 
2. - For an offense committed outside the territory of the requesting Party, the requested 
Party shall grant extradition if: 
a) its laws would provide for the punishment of such an offense committed in similar 
circumstances, or 
b) the person sought is a national of the requesting Party, and that Party has jurisdiction 
under its own laws to try that person. 
Id. at art. 1.  The extradition of nationals is governed by Article 9 of the Extradition Treaty, which 
provides: 
1. - Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up its own nationals, but the 
executive authority of the requested Party shall, if not prevented by the laws of that Party, 
have the power to deliver them up if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper to do so. 
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court held that Mexico’s express protest of the abduction vested Alvarez-
Machain’s rights under the extradition treaty.30  The court went on to note that 
“[i]t is axiomatic that the United States or Mexico violates its contracting 
partner’s sovereignty, and the extradition treaty, when it unilaterally abducts a 
person from the territory of its contracting partner without the participation of 
or authorization from the contracting partner where the offended state registers 
an official protest.”31  As a remedy for the violation, the court ordered the 
immediate return of Alvarez-Machain to Mexico.32  The government 
subsequently appealed the district court’s decision, and Alvarez-Machain was 
not repatriated to Mexico. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling, 
relying on its earlier decision in United States v. Verdugo Urquidez.33  In 
Verdugo, the court held that the forcible abduction of a Mexican national from 
Mexico by United States government officials without Mexico’s consent 
violated the Extradition Treaty between the two states.34  The United States 
 
2. - If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the requested Party 
shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, provided 
that Party has jurisdiction over the offense. 
Id. at art. 9. 
 30. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 608. 
 31. Id. at 610.  In addition to the two claims mentioned above, Alvarez-Machain sought 
dismissal based on violations of the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of 
American States and under the court’s supervisory powers.  Id. at 601.  Although the court did not 
reach these issues, it noted that although the United States’ involvement in the abduction of 
Alvarez-Machain appeared to violate the Charter of the United Nations and Charter of the 
Organization of American States, “the weight of authority indicates that these international 
instruments are not self-executing and therefore are not enforceable in federal courts absent 
implementing legislation.”  Id. at 614.  In addition, the court warned: 
[W]e can reach a time when in the interest of establishing and maintaining civilized 
standards of procedure and evidence, we may wish to bar jurisdiction in an abduction case 
as a matter not of constitutional law but in the exercise of our supervisory power. . . .  To 
my mind the Government in its laudable interest of stopping the international drug traffic 
is by these repeated abductions inviting exercise of that supervisory power in the interest 
of the greater good of preserving respect for the law. 
Id. at 615 (quoting United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 73 (2d. Cir. 1975) (Oakes, J., concurring)). 
 32. Id. at 614. 
 33. 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 34. Id. at 1350-55.  The court observed that forcible abductions violated the purpose of the 
Extradition Treaty even though they were not expressly prohibited by it.  In particular, the Ninth 
Circuit held: 
[E]xtradition treaties provide a comprehensive means of regulating the methods by which 
one nation may remove an individual from another nation for the purpose of subjecting 
him to criminal prosecution, and that unless the nation from which an individual has been 
forcibly abducted consents to that action in advance, or subsequently by its silence or 
otherwise waives its right to object, a government authorized or sponsored abduction 
constitutes a breach of the treaty.  To hold to the contrary would seriously undermine the 
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government again appealed this decision, and the Supreme Court granted the 
petition for certiorari. 
The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
reversed the Ninth Circuit.  The Court first reaffirmed the Ker-Frisbie doctrine 
because “[t]here is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a 
guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to 
trial against his will.”35  The Court held that the district court had jurisdiction 
to try Alvarez-Machain even though he had been forcibly abducted from 
Mexico because the Extradition Treaty did not prohibit such action.36 
The Court considered both the express language and the implications of the 
treaty.  The Court first concluded that the “Treaty says nothing about the 
obligations of the United States and Mexico to refrain from forcible abductions 
of people from the territory of the other nation, or the consequences under the 
Treaty if such an abduction occurs.”37  The Court next examined Alvarez-
Machain’s argument that the Treaty needed to be examined in the context of 
customary international law. The majority found that while Alvarez-Machain’s 
abduction might have been “shocking” and in “violation of general 
international law principles,” it did not violate the Extradition Treaty and, as 
such, did not prohibit his prosecution.38 
Justice Stevens’s dissent provided a stark contrast to the majority opinion.  
He seemed to be appalled by the government conduct and the majority’s 
approval of it.39  First, Justice Stevens noted that the Treaty “appears to have 
 
utility and vitality not only of our extradition treaty with Mexico but of all of our 
extradition treaties. 
Id. at 1355.  The court’s holding and decision to repatriate the defendant were based on “general 
principles of international law.”  Id. at 1351-52. 
 35. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 662 (1992). 
 36. Id. at 660-70. 
 37. Id. at 663.  The Supreme Court further elaborated that the Mexican government was 
aware of the Ker doctrine as early as 1906 and the United States position as to forcible abductions 
and a court’s jurisdiction.  The Court found that despite Mexico’s knowledge, “the current 
version of the Treaty . . . does not attempt to establish a rule that would in any way curtail the 
effect of Ker.  Id. at 665.  Nevertheless, Mexico is not obligated to rely on United States domestic 
courts’ interpretations of legal doctrines, and it would be more reasonable for Mexico to rely on 
its own courts’ interpretations of international law.  However, it would make the most sense for 
the countries to rely on an interpretation by an international body like the International Court of 
Justice or the United Nations.  Hernan De J. Ruiz-Bravo, Monstrous Decision: Kidnapping is 
Legal, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833, 865 (1993). 
 38. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 669-70.  However, “[k]idnapping is against the nature, 
purpose, and goals of the Extradition Treaty.  Although fast and effective, kidnapping sidesteps 
the safeguards described in the Extradition Treaty to protect individual human rights and asylum 
country sovereignty.”  Ruiz-Bravo, supra note 37, at 860. 
 39. Justices Blackmun and O’Connor joined in the dissent.  Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 
670-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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been designed to cover the entire subject of extradition.”40  The dissent further 
elaborated that “[i]t is shocking that a party to an extradition treaty might 
believe that it has secretly reserved the right to make seizures of citizens in the 
other party’s territory.”41  As support for his contentions, Justice Stevens stated 
various authorities of international law to show that international opinion 
condemns forcible abductions as violations of the territorial integrity of 
sovereign nations.42 
Finally, Justice Stevens warned of the risks that follow from the majority’s 
opinion, which it saw as revenge for the murder of an American law 
enforcement agent.  He noted: 
Indeed, the desire for revenge exerts ‘a kind of hydraulic pressure . . . before 
which even well settled principles of law will bend,’ but it is precisely at such 
moments that we should remember and be guided by our duty ‘to render 
judgment evenly and dispassionately according to law, as each is given 
understanding to ascertain and apply it.’43 
Thus Stevens felt that transborder forcible abductions violate both international 
law and the United States’ treaty obligations. 
 
 40. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 673 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  While considering the 
purpose of the Extradition Treaty with Mexico, Justice Stevens added that “[i]t is difficult to see 
how an interpretation that encourages unilateral action could foster cooperation and mutual 
assistance—the stated goals of the Treaty.”  Id. at 673, n.4.  He went on to observe that provisions 
of the Treaty “would serve little purpose if the requesting country could simply kidnap the 
person. . . .  ‘[E]ach of these provisions would be utterly frustrated if a kidnapping were held to 
be a permissible course of governmental conduct.’”  Id. at 673 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1349 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 504 U.S. 665 (1992)). 
 41. Id. at 678-79. 
 42. Id. at 678-81.  In particular, Justice Stevens considered the Charter of the Organization 
of American States, numerous provisions of the United Nations Charter, Oppenheim’s 
International Law, and the American Law Institute’s Restatement of Foreign Relations.  The chief 
reporter for the Restatement of Foreign Relations states: 
[w]hen done without consent of the foreign government, abducting a person from a 
foreign country is a gross violation of international law and gross disrespect for a norm 
high in the opinion of mankind.  It is a blatant violation of the territorial integrity of 
another state; it eviscerates the extradition system. . . . 
Id. at 681 (quoting Louis Henkin, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, 25 J. MARSHALL 
L. REV. 215, 231 (1992) (footnote omitted). 
 43. Id. at 687 (quoting N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 401 (1904) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) and United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 342 (1947) (Rutledge, J., 
dissenting)) (citation omitted).  Justice Stevens reminds us of Thomas Paine’s warning: 
an “avidity to punish is always dangerous to liberty” because it leads a nation “to stretch, 
to misinterpret, and to misapply even the best of laws.”  “He that would make his own 
liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he 
establishes a precedent that will reach to himself.” 
Id. at 688 (quoting 2 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 588 (P. Foner ed. 1945)) 
(footnote omitted). 
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On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
considered the issue of whether customary international law alone could justify 
the dismissal of the indictment and Alvarez-Machain’s return to Mexico.  The 
court held that an international customary law exception to the Ker-Frisbie 
doctrine has only been recognized “in a situation where the government’s 
conduct was outrageous,”44 therefore denying Alvarez-Machain’s motion.  
Nevertheless, on remand, the court granted his motion for acquittal, holding 
that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute.  District Court Judge 
Rafeedie explained that “the evidence presented against Alvarez had been 
based on ‘hunches’ and the ‘wildest speculation’ and had failed to support the 
government’s allegations.”45 
2. The Civil Suit 
Following the end of the criminal case, Alvarez-Machain filed a civil suit 
in U.S. federal district court requesting damages for his abduction and 
detention.  Alleging civil rights violations and violations under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),46 he filed 
claims against the United States, the D.E.A. agents who abducted him, a 
former Mexican policeman, and Mexican civilians.  Alvarez-Machain’s claims 
first reached the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2001, and a three-judge 
panel rendered an opinion.  The case was subsequently reheard by the Court of 
Appeals en banc, which submitted an opinion in June 2003. 
The three-judge panel held that Alvarez-Machain’s kidnapping was a 
violation of the law of nations, as required by the ATCA, because it violated 
customary international human rights law.47  In particular, the panel found that 
“[a]lthough no international human rights instruments refers to transborder 
 
 44. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 971 F.2d 310, 311 (9th Cir. 1992).  For detailed 
information on this exception, see United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(finding that a court should not have jurisdiction over a defendant when he has been forcibly 
abducted and subjected to torture and abuse at the behest of the U.S. government); United States 
v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 901-02 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the misconduct of the government 
agent must reach the level of “gross mistreatment” in order for a court to divest itself of 
jurisdiction following a transborder abduction). 
 45. Aceves, supra note 10, at 116. 
 46. See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Alvarez-
Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 1997).  Specifically, he alleged the following 
tort claims: (1) kidnapping; (2) torture; (3) cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or 
punishment; (4) arbitrary detention; (5) assault and battery; (6) false imprisonment; (7) intentional 
infliction of emotional distress; (8) false arrest; (9) negligent employment; and (10) negligent 
infliction of emotional distress.  Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 610 n.1. 
 47. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’d en banc, 
331 F.3d 604 (2003).  As background, the ATCA provides that “[t]he district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the 
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
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abduction specifically,” various international human rights norms encompass 
it, such as “the rights to freedom of movement, to remain in one’s country, and 
to security in one’s person.”48  It further held that the detention of Alvarez-
Machain violated the international customary legal norm against arbitrary 
detention.49  “[D]etention is arbitrary if ‘it is not pursuant to law; it may be 
arbitrary also if it is incompatible with the principles of justice or with the 
dignity of the human person.’”50  The three-judge panel noted that the arrest 
was only arbitrary while he was held in Mexico because the lawful arrest 
warrant and indictment issued in the United States “broke the chain of 
causation.”51 
The three-judge panel also held that neither the foreign activities 
exception, nor the intentional torts exception applied to Alvarez-Machain’s 
FTCA claim.52  The foreign activities exception did not apply because 
Alvarez-Machain asserted a valid “headquarters claim.” Under the 
“headquarters doctrine,” the FTCA requires courts to “look at the law of the 
place where the act took place, rather than the place where the act had its 
operative effect.”53  The three-judge panel found that all of the command 
decisions about the abduction occurred in the United States even though the 
actual kidnapping took place in Mexico.54  In addition, the panel found that the 
intentional torts exception did not apply because investigative or law 
enforcement officers committed the torts.55  After this decision was rendered in 
 
 48. Alvarez-Machain, 266 F.3d at 1051.  The three-judge panel specifically considered the 
American Convention on Human Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man.  Id. at 1051-52. 
 49. Id. at 1052. 
 50. Id. (quoting Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
 51. Id. at 1063. 
 52. Alvarez-Machain, 266 F.3d at 1054-57.  The foreign activities exception to the FTCA 
means that the Act does not apply to “[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country.”  28 U.S.C. § 
2680(k) (2000).  The intentional torts exception states that the FTCA does not apply to: 
[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious 
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference 
with contract rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or 
law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter 
and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the 
enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of 
process, or malicious prosecution.  For the purpose of this subsection, ‘investigative or 
law enforcement officer’ means any officer of the United States who is empowered by 
law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal 
law. 
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2000). 
 53. Alvarez-Machain, 266 F.3d at 1054. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1056. 
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2001, however, a majority of nonrecused judges of the Ninth Circuit voted to 
rehear the case en banc.56 
In considering Alvarez-Machain’s claims, the court first held that Alvarez-
Machain lacked standing to assert Mexico’s interests in its territorial 
sovereignty because the ATCA does not allow an individual to defend the 
rights of a foreign country.57  The court next reached the issue of transborder 
abduction and customary international law.  It found that the “United States 
does not recognize a prohibition against transborder kidnapping, nor can it be 
said that there is international acceptance of such a norm.”58  The Court of 
Appeals, sitting en banc, did not find the previous three-judge panel’s opinion 
that the restriction of an individual’s right to freedom of movement and 
security of person translated into a right to be free from forcible transborder 
abductions.  The court found that such general prohibitions are insufficient to 
support a claim under the ATCA because the ATCA requires a “specific, 
universal, and obligatory” violation of the laws of nations.59 
Despite this setback for Alvarez-Machain, the Court of Appeals held that 
there was an international norm prohibiting arbitrary arrest and detention.60  
The court reiterated the three-judge panel’s definition of arbitrary detention 
and stated that the norm is against arbitrary detention—not pursuant to the 
law—and does not have a temporal element to it.61  Applying the standard to 
Alvarez-Machain, the court held that “there was, quite simply, no basis in law 
for the unilateral extraterritorial arrest and related detention of Alvarez in 
Mexico.”62  The court did not find the argument that the United States had an 
arrest warrant for Alvarez-Machain persuasive because a federal arrest warrant 
does not operate as a license to effectuate arrests throughout the world.63 
Likewise, the court was not persuaded by the argument that it lacked 
jurisdiction over the defendants because the incident occurred outside the 
United States.  Instead, the court stated that it was this same principle of 
extraterritoriality that caused the Supreme Court to conclude that Alvarez-
Machain could be tried in the United States.64  Along the same lines, the court 
importantly noted that “[e]xtraterritorial application . . . does not automatically 
 
 56. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 284 F.3d 1039, 1040 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 57. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 616 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 58. Id. at 617. 
 59. Id. at 619. 
 60. Id. at 620.  The court found that the prohibition against arbitrary arrest and detention is 
“codified in every major comprehensive human rights instrument and is reflected in at least 119 
national constitutions.”  Id. 
 61. Id. at 621. 
 62. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 623. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 624. 
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give rise to extraterritorial enforcement authority.”65  In looking at the statutes 
relating to the D.E.A., it found that D.E.A. agents are granted felony arrest 
power, but that no language in the statute allows this power to go beyond the 
borders of the United States.66  In conclusion, the court held that the arrest and 
detention of Alvarez-Machain were arbitrary because they were not pursuant to 
law.  There was no basis in law for the D.E.A.’s actions, and a warrant issued 
by a United States court cannot authorize extraterritorial abductions of 
defendants.67 
The court agreed with the three-judge panel’s assessment of Alvarez-
Machain’s FTCA claim and held that neither the foreign activities exception 
nor the intentional tort exception applied.68  In addition, the court agreed that 
the United States should be substituted for the individual D.E.A. agents under 
the FTCA.69  Alvarez-Machain succeeded on his ATCA claim against Sosa, 
the Mexican policeman who kidnapped him, and on the FTCA claim against 
the United States at the Court of Appeals.  However, the Supreme Court 
recently granted certiorari on petitions from the United States and Sosa.70 
Four separate issues are raised between the two petitions.  In the case 
regarding the United States, the Court is asked to decide whether federal law 
enforcement officers have the authority to arrest an indicted suspect in a 
foreign country.71  In addition, the Court will decide whether a suspect arrested 
in another country can bring an action under the FTCA for false arrest, 
notwithstanding the FTCA’s foreign activities exception.72 
 
 65. Id. at 625. 
 66. Id. at 626.  In addition, “an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law 
of nations if any other possible construction remains.” (quoting Murray v. Schooner Charming 
Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804)). 
 67. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 623-26. 
 68. Id. at 638-40. 
 69. Alvarez-Machain’s ATCA claim against the United States failed because of the Federal 
Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, which provides that the exclusive 
remedy for the wrongful act of a federal employee acting within the scope of his duties and 
against the United States is through the FTCA.  Id. at 631. 
 70. U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 821 (Dec. 1, 2003) (No. 03-485); Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 124 S.Ct. 807 (Dec. 1, 2003) (No. 03-339). 
 71. Petition of United States, at I, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 821 (2003) 
(No. 03-485).  Interestingly enough, the Bush administration has turned the case into one about 
the war on terrorism, rather than focusing on the smaller issue of the specific DEA agents 
involved in the case.  In the petition for certiorari, the government claims that the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding “threatens the government’s ability to conduct necessary law enforcement operations 
abroad to combat terrorism, international crime, and the flow of illegal drugs into the United 
States.”  Id. at 15.  However, as Respondent’s brief points out, “[t]his case is not about . . . the 
war on terrorism,” and the “United States is simply using the war on terrorism as a subterfuge to 
ask [the] Court to involve itself in an unrelated dispute.” Brief in Opposition to Petition of United 
States, at 14, 16, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 821 (2003) (No. 03-485). 
 72. Petition of United States, at I, Alvarez-Machain, (No. 03-485). 
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The more anticipated questions are raised by Sosa’s petition, which 
presents questions about the legitimacy and scope of the ATCA.73  First, the 
Court must decide whether the ATCA creates a private cause of action or 
instead is merely a jurisdiction-granting statute that does not establish a private 
right of action.74  If the Court finds that the ATCA does establish a private 
cause of action, it must then decide if the arrest of Alvarez-Machain in Mexico 
is actionable under the statute.75 
III.  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOLLOWING ALVAREZ-
MACHAIN 
There was international outrage following the Supreme Court’s Alvarez-
Machain decision. Governments and scholars alike expressed extreme 
disagreement and disgust with the Court’s disrespect and disregard for 
principles of international law.76  Despite the United States’ adherence to the 
principle of “mala captus bene detentus,”77 there is international precedent that 
 
 73. These questions are more anticipated as they relate to the hotly debated ATCA.  With the 
increasing appearance of the ATCA in litigation, there is a split of opinions as to the efficacy and 
legitimacy of the statute.  Robert Bork, a former Supreme Court nominee, complained that an 
unholy alliance of imperialistic judges and a leftish cadre of international law professors “[have] 
turned this same statute into a tool for ‘judicial imperialism.’”  Daphne Eviatar, Judgment Day: 
Will an Obscure Law Bring Down the Global Economy?, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 28, 2003, at D1.  
On the other hand, the executive director of Human Rights Watch considers opinions like Bork’s 
to be “a craven attempt to protect human rights abusers at the expense of victims.”  Id. 
 74. Brief for the United States at I, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 807 (2003) (No. 03-
339).  The United States contends that the ATCA does not establish a private cause of action.  
Nevertheless, the U.S. government, in its official submission to the U.N. Committee Against 
Torture, described the ATCA as a statute that provides a right of action for civil damages for 
torture occurring in a foreign territory.  Specifically, the government stated that the ATCA 
“represents an early effort to provide a judicial remedy to individuals whose rights have been 
violated under international law.”  Brief for Alvarez-Machain at 16, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
124 S.Ct. 807 (2003) (No. 03-339).  For more detail of how the United States has repeatedly 
contradicted their apparent opposition to the ATCA, see id. 
 75. Brief for the United States at I, Sosa (No. 03-339). 
 76. Indeed, the United States Senate proposed a resolution out of concern for the 
international implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Alvarez-Machain.  See S. Res. 319, 
102d Cong. (1992).  The resolution first recognized that other nations might think that the U.S. 
accepts the legality of kidnapping.  Id.  It then stated that criminals should be pursued “through 
the existing international legal framework, including extradition treaties; and,[the] United States 
officials should refrain from committing the crime of kidnapping which weakens international 
cooperation against crime, encourages the abduction of American citizens and subverts respect 
for the rule of law.”  Id; see Mark S. Zaid, Military Might Versus Sovereign Right: The 
Kidnapping of Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain and the Resulting Fallout, 19 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 
829 (1997). 
 77. Professor Bassiouni describes this maxim as the process whereby “national courts will 
assert in personam jurisdiction without inquiring into the means by which the presence of the 
defendant was secured.”  BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 250. 
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transborder abductions violate international law when the abducting country 
detains and tries the victim.  This Section reviews this precedent and considers 
the international community’s response when such an abduction occurs. 
A. History of International Condemnation of Transborder Abductions 
The international community condemned transborder abductions prior to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Alvarez-Machain. The United Nations 
Security Council has criticized state-sponsored abductions twice.  The first 
occurred after Israel abducted a Nazi official, Adolf Eichmann, from Argentina 
on charges of crimes against humanity during World War II.78  Argentina 
petitioned the Security Council requesting Eichmann’s return and for the 
punishment of the abductors.  The Council adopted a resolution stating that 
Israel violated Argentina’s sovereignty and requested the “Government of 
Israel to make appropriate reparation.”79 
On a more general level, the Security Council has acknowledged that 
“abductions are offenses of grave concern to the international community, 
having severe adverse consequences for the rights of the victims and for the 
promotion of friendly relations and cooperation among States,” and has 
condemned “unequivocally all acts of . . . abduction.”80  Thus, it is apparent 
that the United Nations body charged with maintaining international peace and 
security condemns transborder abductions. 
In a more recent case, the South African Supreme Court ordered the 
release of a defendant abducted from Swaziland after finding that the court 
lacked jurisdiction due to the forcible transborder abduction.81  In that case, 
South African authorities forcibly abducted Ebrahim from Swaziland despite 
an extradition treaty between the two countries.82  The South African Supreme 
Court held that a court lacks jurisdiction to try a person kidnapped from a 
foreign territory by state actors.83 
Basing the decision on Roman-Dutch law, the South African Supreme 
Court reasoned that a person “must be protected against illegal detention and 
 
 78. Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 5 (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1961) 
(summary, A. Munkman), aff’d, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Supp. Ct. Isr. 1962). 
 79. S.C. Res. 138, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 865th mtg., at 14, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960). 
 80. S.C. Res. 579, U.N. Doc. S/RES/579 (1985), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 243 (1986). 
 81. South Africa: Supreme Court (Appellate Division) Opinion in State v. Ebrahim 
(Jurisdiction Over Abducted Person) February 16, 1991, 31 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS JUD. & 
SIMILAR PROC. 888 (John Dugard ed. 1992) [hereinafter Dugard].  Justice Stevens referred to this 
decision in his dissenting opinion in Alvarez-Machain.  U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 
687 (1992).  While considering Ebrahim, Stevens noted that “[t]he Court of Appeal of South 
Africa—indeed, I suspect most courts throughout the civilized world—will be deeply disturbed 
by the ‘monstrous’ decision the Court announces today.”  Id. 
 82. Dugard, supra note 81, at 890-91. 
 83. Id. at 899. 
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abduction, the bounds of jurisdiction must not be exceeded, sovereignty must 
be respected, the legal process must be fair to those affected and abuse of law 
must be avoided in order to protect and promote the integrity of the 
administration of justice.”84  The Ebrahim court also referenced United States 
v. Toscanino85 and agreed with the outcome of the case.86  In addition to 
having the case dismissed, Ebrahim received compensation for the abduction 
in a civil case.87  Although the Ebrahim decision is based more on municipal 
law than international law, it still represents an important precedent because it 
indicates a movement of customary international law toward prohibiting 
jurisdiction over an individual abducted from another nation. 
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has also held that transborder 
abductions violate Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).88  In the case of Lilian Celiberti de Casariego, a 
Uruguayan/Italian citizen was forcibly abducted from an apartment in Brazil 
by Uruguayan agents on suspicion of “subversive association” and taken into 
 
 84. Id. at 896.  The court also noted that “[w]hen the state is a party to a dispute, as for 
example in criminal cases, it must come to court with ‘clean hands.’  When the state itself is 
involved in an abduction across international borders, as in the present case, its hands are not 
clean.”  Id. 
 85. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 86. Id. at 896-97.  In Toscanino, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a court 
should “divest itself of jurisdiction” after a transborder abduction “where it has been acquired as 
the result of the government’s deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused’s 
constitutional rights.”  Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275; see infra notes 134-38 and accompanying 
text. 
 87. Ebrahim v. Minister of Law and Order, 1993 (2) SA 559 (C). 
 88. “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. . . .  No one shall be deprived 
of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established 
by law.”  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9(1), Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm (entered into force 
Mar. 23, 1976).  Because the United States did not adopt a reservation to Article 9(1), if a 
transborder abduction like that of Alvarez-Machain occurred in the future, the defendant could 
raise Article 9(1) as a defense to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.  David Sloss, The Domestication 
of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 
YALE J. INT’L L. 129, 196 (1999).  However, the United States did not ratify the Optional 
Protocol of the ICCPR, which gives the HRC jurisdiction to hear cases.  Therefore, the HRC 
cannot hear a case in which the U.S. is a party.  BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 236.  The HRC has 
also found countries in violation of the ICCPR for abductions even though they only assisted in 
the abduction.  In one case, a Colombian citizen was abducted in Ecuador at the command of the 
United States DEA and deported to the United States.  Although no action could be brought 
against the United States, the HRC found that Ecuador was in violation of ICCPR Article 9(1).  
Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Forty-third Session, Cañón Garcia v. 
Ecuador, Human Rights Committee, 43d Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/319/1988 
(1991). 
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Uruguay.89  The HRC held that the abduction violated Article 9(1) of the 
ICCPR, as it constituted an arbitrary arrest and detention and ordered that 
Celiberti de Casariego be immediately released from custody, compensated for 
violations, and allowed to leave the country.90 
Thus before the abduction of Alvarez-Machain, it was clear that 
transborder abductions violated international law. 91  Furthermore, international 
law has acknowledged that the correct remedy is to repatriate the victim and 
offer monetary compensation.  Because this is the norm, the next section will 
detail how the international community reacted to the Supreme Court’s 
decision to lend more credence to the conception that transborder abductions 
violate international law. 
B. International Response to Alvarez-Machain 
Not surprisingly, the Mexican government was highly critical of the 
Supreme Court’s decision because its territorial sovereignty and the personal 
liberty of its citizen had been disregarded by the highest court of the United 
States.92 The Mexican Foreign Ministry criticized the decision as 
“transgressing basic principles of international law.”93 The Mexican 
government felt that the extradition treaty was the only legitimate way to 
apprehend a suspect and temporarily suspended cooperation with D.E.A. 
agents in Mexico.94  However, negotiations between the United States and 
Mexico led to the signing of the Transborder Abduction Treaty in 1994, which 
suggests an effort by both countries towards improvement in extradition 
 
 89. Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, R.13/56, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. 
A/36/40 (1981), at 185, reprinted in 68 I.L.R. 41 (1981). 
 90. Id; see Lopez v. Uruguay, R.12/52, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 
(1981), at 76, reprinted in 68 I.L.R. 29 (1981) (holding that the transborder of a Uruguayan 
national from Argentina by Uruguayan agents violated Article 9(1) and ordering his immediate 
release and compensation). 
 91. The State Department Legal Adviser noted that it is important for the judiciary to 
consider international law and implications: 
Specifically, we believe that both the administration of justice and the foreign relations of 
the United States are best served when the United States courts take into consideration the 
views of foreign governments on issues of concern to them.  It is important that courts be 
made aware of the international implications of their decisions and that they give 
appropriate weight to these considerations in the process of making their decisions. 
CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 318 (2003). 
 92. Following the Supreme Court’s decision, the Mexican Foreign Minister held a press 
conference in which, among other things, it called the decision “invalid and illegal” and 
demanded the repatriation of Alvarez-Machain. Zaid, supra note 76, at 842. 
 93. David Clark Scott, U.S. Court Ruling Provokes Heated Mexican Retort, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, June 17, 1992, at 1. 
 94. Id.; Tim Golden, Mexicans Mollified Over Drug Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1992, at 
A3. 
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policies.95  Most importantly, the remedy for a violation of the Treaty is 
repatriation of the abductee.96 
In response to the Alvarez-Machain decision, the Inter-American Juridical 
Committee of the Organization of American States (OAS) found that the 
abduction violated Mexico’s territorial sovereignty and that the United States’ 
refusal to repatriate Alvarez-Machain was a further violation of Mexico’s 
territorial sovereignty.97  The Committee emphasized “the incompatibility of 
the practice of abduction with the right of due process to which every person is 
entitled, no matter how serious the crime they are accused of, a right protected 
by international law.”98  The Committee was of the opinion that Alvarez-
Machain’s personal rights were violated by the abduction and that this violated 
international law.  In addition, the participants of the Ibero-American Summit 
Conference requested the U.N. General Assembly to present an issue to the 
International Court of Justice for an Advisory Opinion on the legality of 
transborder abductions.99 
The U.N. General Assembly agreed that international law prohibits a State 
from exercising its jurisdiction beyond its borders because it violates the 
territorial integrity and sovereign equality of States.100 It decided that 
 
 95. Treaty to Prohibit Transborder Abductions, Nov. 23, 1994, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059, 
reprinted in MICHAEL ABBEL & BRUNO A. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE, 
CRIMINAL EXTRADITION A-676.3 (Vol. 5 1995 & Supp. 1995) [hereinafter Transborder 
Abduction Treaty].  The Treaty provides: 
[t]he purpose of this Treaty is to prohibit transborder abductions. 
. . . 
The Parties shall not conduct transborder abductions. 
. . . 
For the purposes of this Treaty, a “transborder abduction” occurs when a person is 
removed from the territory of one Party to the territory of the other Party: 
(a) By force or threat of force; and 
(b) By federal, state or local government officials of the Party to whose territory the 
person is taken, or by private individuals acting under the direction of such officials. 
. . . 
Individuals responsible for transborder abductions shall be subject to prosecution in 
accordance with the laws of the Requesting and Requested Parties. 
Transborder Abduction Treaty, at art. 1, 2, 3(1), 6(1). 
 96. Id. at art. 5(1).  However, “[t]he obligation to repatriate shall not apply if (a) the 
Requesting Party does not make an explicit request for repatriation, or (b) the abducted person 
opposes repatriation.” Id. at art. 5(2).  Neither the Treaty itself, nor a violation of it creates private 
rights for individuals.  Id. at art. 7. 
 97. Legal Opinion on the Decision of the US Supreme Court in the Alvarez-Machain Case, 
CP/RES 586 (909/92), Inter-Am. Juridical Committee Doc. CJI/RES.II-15/92, reprinted in 13 
HUM. RTS. L.J. 395, 396 (1992). 
 98. Id. at 5, reprinted in 13 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 397. 
 99. Aceves, supra note 10, at 121. 
 100. Virginia Morris & M. Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, The Work of the Sixth Committee 
at the Forty-Eighth Session of the UN General Assembly, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 343, 357-58 (1994). 
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transborder abductions undermine existing mechanisms for international 
cooperation in the apprehension of criminals and extradition treaties.101  The 
U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention also determined that transborder 
abductions violate international customary law.102 In particular, the Working 
Group found that: 
[N]o legal basis whatsoever can be found to justify the deprivation of freedom 
from the date of the abduction - 2 April 1990 - until his release on 14 
December 1992 since this deprivation of freedom took place without the orders 
of any authority whatsoever and, indeed, both the District Court and the Court 
of Appeals declared it unlawful.103 
The Working Group, thus, declared that the United States’ position with regard 
to transborder abductions is mistaken and violates customary international law. 
In addition to the U.N. declaration, several nations issued statements 
expressly condemning the Supreme Court’s decision.104  The decision was 
referred to as “an historic regression in criminal law,” and one government 
claimed “the ruling allows the United States government to ‘solve a crime with 
a crime.’”105  A few nations stated that an abduction within their territory 
would be regarded as a criminal act and as a violation of any extradition treaty 
in place.106  The Costa Rican Supreme Court issued a statement regarding the 
decision stating: 
Legaliz(ing) abduction by other States’ officials to bring the abducted before 
the courts of such country, is not only contrary to modern times, but is against 
the ideals it forged upon the principles of respect to freedom and human 
dignity, is against the ideals of independence of that nation, and infringes its 
highest principles and those of the rest of nations, that have the natural right to 
protect its inhabitants and to judge them according to due process. . . .107 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Question of the Human Rights of all Persons Subjected to any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment: Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U. N. Commission on 
Human Rights,  48/1993, at ¶¶ 5(n)-(p), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/27 (1993). 
 103. Id. at ¶ 5(r). 
 104. Zaid, supra note 76, at 840-58.  See Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller, Jurisdiction Over 
Persons Abducted in Violation of International Law in the Aftermath of United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 205, 235-38 (1998). 
 105. Zaid, supra note 76, at 844, 852.  In reference to the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Swiss 
Justice Ministry spokesman commented, “[i]magine where it would lead if every country would 
do that.  You would have anarchy.” Id. at 852. 
 106. See id. at 844-53. 
 107. Id. at 848 (alteration in original).  The Cuban government released a statement regarding 
Alvarez-Machain, which stated: 
  [t]he decision of the highest North American court, now controlled by 
ultraconservatives and racists, defines its character as an instrument of the imperialist 
policy and proves evident the falsehood of the pretended independence of the Judicial 
Power in that country. 
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It is clear from these views that many countries consider any attempt at a 
forcible transborder abduction as a violation of their territorial sovereignty, the 
victim’s personal rights, and principles of international law.  As such, it is clear 
the United States’ policy on carrying out transborder abductions stands in stark 
contrast to the views of the rest of the world. 
C. Two Violations of International Law: Abduction and Failure to Provide a 
Defensive Remedy 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) held in the LaGrand case that not 
only did the United States violate international legal obligations under the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations by not ensuring the LaGrands’ 
rights under the Convention, but it also violated international law by failing to 
provide a remedy for the violation of these rights.108  Under the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations (“Vienna Convention”), a state is required 
to inform a foreigner of his right to contact his consulate.109  The consulate has 
a right to visit the prisoner who is in custody, “to correspond with him and to 
arrange for his legal representation.”110 
In LaGrand, two German nationals were convicted and sentenced to death 
in the United States without receiving notification of their rights as required 
under the Vienna Convention.111  The ICJ released a provisional measure 
requesting that the United States stay the execution of the LaGrand brothers 
pending its final decision.112  Nevertheless, the United States executed the two 
brothers.113 
The ICJ first recognized that the Convention “creates individual rights” 
and that the “laws and regulations [of the U.S.] . . . must enable full effect to be 
given to the purposes for which the rights . . . [of the foreign national] are 
intended.”114  The Court then found that the “procedural default rule” violated 
 
  The Government of the Republic of Cuba reaffirms that national sovereignty is 
inviolable and that it can not be questioned, nor belittled by false decisions of foreign 
tribunals and that no state, powerful as it may be, has any authority whatsoever to ignore 
the rules of law and to act as if it owned the world. 
Id. at 849. 
 108. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. at ¶ 128 (June 27). 
 109. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Apr. 24, 
1963, art. 36(1)(b), 21 U.S.T. 77.  The Convention was enacted to develop friendly relations 
among nation-states and to provide for more efficient consulate functioning. 
 110. Id. at art. 36(1)(c). 
 111. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at ¶¶ 10-29. 
 112. Id. at ¶ 29. 
 113. Id. at ¶¶ 30-34.  Although the United States attempted to argue that the provisional 
measure was not an order, but a suggestion or request that was not binding on it, the ICJ did not 
find this argument persuasive.  Id. at ¶¶ 92-109.  The Court ultimately held that provisional 
measures have a binding effect.  Id. 
 114. Id. at ¶¶ 77, 88. 
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the Convention by preventing LaGrand from challenging his conviction and 
sentence.115  Finally, the ICJ held: 
[A]n apology would not suffice in cases where the individuals concerned have 
been subjected to prolonged detention or convicted and sentenced to severe 
penalties.  In the case of such a conviction and sentence, it would be incumbent 
upon the United States to allow the review and reconsideration of the 
conviction and sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights set 
forth in the Convention.  This obligation can be carried out in various ways.  
The choice of means must be left to the United States.116 
Thus, the ICJ held that the United States violated international law by 
breaching its obligations under the Vienna Convention and by not providing a 
defensive remedy to LaGrand. 
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in Torres v. Mullin,117 which 
is a case similar to LaGrand.  The facts of the case are almost identical to 
LaGrand.  A Mexican national was convicted and sentenced to death without 
being notified of his rights under the Vienna Convention.118  He subsequently 
raised the Vienna Convention claim on habeas corpus and the district court 
found that he procedurally defaulted the claim under state law.119 
Although certiorari was denied, Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote 
dissenting opinions from the denial of certiorari.  Justice Breyer considered the 
ICJ’s decision in LaGrand significant and reasoned that “[g]iven the 
international implications of the issues raised . . . further information, analysis, 
and consideration are necessary.”120  Justice Stevens noted that “[a]pplying the 
procedural default rule to Article 36 claims is not only in direct violation of the 
Vienna Convention, but it is also manifestly unfair.”121  Justice Stevens also 
 
 115. Id. at ¶¶ 90-91. 
 116. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J.at ¶ 125. 
 117. Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2003).  Interestingly enough, since the 
LaGrand decision, most state and federal courts that have been confronted with an Article 36 
claim have not mentioned the ICJ decision or departed from the precedent of denying relief. 
Sarah M. Ray, Comment, Domesticating International Obligations: How to Ensure U.S. 
Compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1729, 1753 
(2003).  One court, however, recognized that the ICJ’s interpretation of the Vienna Convention in 
LaGrand is authoritative: “To disregard one of the I.C.J.’s most significant decisions interpreting 
the Vienna Convention would be a decidedly imprudent course. . . .  After LaGrand . . . no court 
can credibly hold that the Vienna Convention does not create individually enforceable rights.”  
U.S. ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, No. 98 C 1866, 2002 WL 31386480, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 
2002). 
 118. See Torres, 317 F.3d at 1150. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Torres v. Mullin, 124 S.Ct. 562, 565 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 121. Torres v. Mullin, No. 03-5781, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8548, at *4 (Nov. 17, 2003) (Stevens, 
J., concurring) (respecting the denial of the petition for certiorari). 
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observed that the Court is “unfaithful” to the Supremacy Clause “when it 
permits state courts to disregard the Nation’s treaty obligations.”122 
From LaGrand, it is clear that the United States violates its treaty 
obligations by not notifying a foreign national of his or her rights under the 
Vienna Convention.  It is equally clear that it is a further violation of 
international law to not provide a defensive remedy for this violation.  The 
dissents of Justices Breyer and Stevens are important in that they note the 
United States’ treaty obligations and the importance of adhering to them 
without violating international law.  In addition, they show the binding effect 
of the ICJ’s decisions on the United States and recognize that by denying a 
defensive remedy to a victim of a Vienna Convention violation, the courts 
ignore the Supremacy Clause and the nation’s treaty obligations. 
IV.  POSSIBLE REMEDIES UNDER UNITED STATES DOMESTIC LAW 
As discussed above, the United States violated both international law and 
Alvarez-Machain’s internationally protected individual rights when it 
kidnapped him.  The U.S. judiciary furthered this violation by upholding 
jurisdiction.  Consequently, the following question arises: What types of 
remedies are potentially available in the U.S. legal system for an individual, 
like Alvarez-Machain, whose personal rights have been violated?  This Part 
will discuss the possible defensive and offensive remedies available to a person 
in a situation similar to that of Alvarez-Machain. 
A. Defensive Remedies 
The defensive remedies that are available in the United States domestic 
legal system are dismissal of the indictment or application of the exclusionary 
rule to illegally obtained evidence.  As shown below, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine 
prevents dismissal of the indictment, and the exclusionary rule does not apply 
because there is no evidence to be excluded.123 
1. Dismissal of the Indictment 
The United States has generally upheld in personam jurisdiction over a 
defendant even when procured through irregular methods by applying the 
maxim “mala captus bene detentus.”124  The two landmark Supreme Court 
cases that courts continually rely on to uphold jurisdiction are Ker v. Illinois125 
and Frisbie v. Collins.126  The rule from the cases combined has come to be 
known as the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.  It stands for the proposition that “criminal 
 
 122. Id. at *5. 
 123. See infra notes 124-53 and accompanying text. 
 124. BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 250. 
 125. 119 U.S. 436 (1886). 
 126. 342 U.S. 519 (1952). 
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jurisdiction is not impaired by the illegality of the method by which the court 
acquires in personam jurisdiction over the relator.”127 
In Ker, the defendant was indicted in Illinois for larceny and 
embezzlement but was living in Peru at the time of indictment.128  Although a 
warrant had been issued for Ker’s arrest, a private citizen forcibly abducted 
Ker rather than using the formal extradition process.129  Ker was subsequently 
tried and convicted in Illinois.  The Supreme Court held that the abduction did 
not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because due 
process only requires that the accused be regularly indicted by a grand jury and 
brought to “trial according to the forms and modes prescribed for such 
trials.”130  The Court upheld Ker’s conviction by holding that Illinois validly 
tried him, regardless of the extralegal methods used to acquire control over 
him.131 
In Frisbie, the defendant, who was living in Chicago, was forcibly seized 
by Michigan state officers and returned to stand trial in Michigan.132  The 
defendant claimed his conviction violated due process, but the Supreme Court, 
relying on Ker, rejected this claim.133  The Court held that “the power of a 
court to try a person for a crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been 
brought within the court’s jurisdiction by reason of a ‘forcible abduction.’”134 
There have been only two exceptions to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, one of 
which was rendered by the Second Circuit in United States v. Toscanino.135  In 
Toscanino, the defendant, an Italian citizen, was forcibly abducted from his 
 
 127. BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 262. 
 128. Ker, 119 U.S. at 437-38. 
 129. Id. at 438.  Justice Stevens pointed out the following fatal flaw in the majority’s reliance 
on Ker in his Alvarez-Machain dissent: There is a crucial difference between a court’s jurisdiction 
over a defendant wrongfully seized by a private citizen, which does not violate any treaty 
obligation, and a defendant illegally abducted at the behest of a government whose authority to 
act had been limited by a treaty.  U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 682-86 (1992) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 130. Ker, 119 U.S. at 440. 
 131. Id.  The Court found that “but . . . for mere irregularities in the manner in which he may 
be brought into custody of the law, we do not think he is entitled to say that he should not be tried 
at all for the crime with which he is charged in a regular indictment.”  Id. 
 132. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 520 (1952). 
 133. Id. at 520-22.  The Court explained, “[t]his Court has never departed from the rule 
announced in [Ker]. . . .  There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a 
guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his 
will.”  Id. at 522. 
 134. Id. at 522. 
 135. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).  The other exception, which was at issue in Alvarez-
Machain, is known as the “treaty exception.”  Under this exception, the treaty must affirmatively 
state that citizens of one country will not be forcibly abducted by the other signator country.  See 
Brandy Sheely, United States v. Best: International Violation Schmiolation—The Ker-Frisbie 
Doctrine Trumps All, 11 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 429, 435-37 (2003). 
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home in Uruguay by agents working for the United States government.136  He 
was driven to Brazil where he was brutally tortured for seventeen days until he 
was drugged and boarded onto a plane.137  Upon arrival in the United States, he 
was convicted by the district court of conspiracy to import and distribute 
narcotics.138  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the Supreme 
Court’s expanding interpretation of due process to hold that a court should 
divest itself of jurisdiction “where it has been acquired as the result of the 
government’s deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the 
accused’s constitutional rights.”139 
Although Toscanino is still good law, it has consistently been 
distinguished and restricted since it was decided to the extent that not one case 
expressly affirms it.  In 1975, the Second Circuit clarified the Toscanino 
holding in United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler.140  The court held that in 
order for a court to divest itself of jurisdiction, the U.S. agent’s actions must 
constitute “conduct of the most outrageous and reprehensible kind.”141  In 
Lujan, the defendant was lured from Argentina into Bolivia and taken into 
custody by Bolivian officials who were paid agents of the United States.142  
The court found that because the conduct did not reach the level of 
egregiousness described in Toscanino, the unconventional means used to 
acquire Lujan did not “convert [his] abduction which is simply illegal into one 
which sinks to a violation of due process.”143  Unfortunately, the various 
circuits throughout the United States have repeatedly limited the Toscanino 
decision to the point that the “United States position . . . remains linked to the 
Ker-Frisbie doctrine.”144 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s decision in Alvarez-Machain reaffirmed 
the Ker-Frisbie doctrine by resting its holding on the doctrine and stating that 
the Court has never departed from the rule.145  In a companion case of Alvarez-
Machain, the Ninth Circuit noted that “[i]n the shadow cast by Alvarez-
Machain, attempts to expand due process rights into the realm of foreign 
abductions, as the Second Circuit did in United States v. Toscanino, have been 
 
 136. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 269. 
 137. Id. at 269-70.  Toscanino’s captors tortured him by denying sleep, food, and water for 
days at a time.  Nourishment was provided intravenously only to the extent needed to keep him 
alive.  In addition, he was kicked, beaten, and shocked with electrodes connected to his earlobes, 
toes, and genitals. Id. at 270. 
 138. Id. at 270. 
 139. Id. at 275. 
 140. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 141. Id. at 65. 
 142. Id. at 63. 
 143. Id. at 66. 
 144. BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 266-67. 
 145. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 661 (1992). 
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cut short.”146  Therefore, the mala captus bene detentus principle of the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine still applies today, and United States courts can validly 
exercise in personam jurisdiction over a defendant who has been forcibly 
abducted from another country.  By foreclosing this defensive remedy, the 
judiciary perpetuates transborder abductions. 
2. Exclusionary Rule 
The exclusionary rule is the other option available to a criminal defendant 
as a defensive remedy.  The exclusionary rule, as formulated by the Supreme 
Court, holds that evidence seized through unconstitutional police conduct is 
inadmissible in court.147  The Supreme Court has stated different policy 
objectives for excluding evidence, including judicial integrity, deterrence of 
police misconduct, and compensation to victims.148  The underlying rationale 
for exclusion, however, is that it is the only remedy that can adequately protect 
the victim’s fundamental constitutional rights.149 
Nevertheless, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court 
held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search and seizure of 
 
 146. United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted) 
(holding that a government-sponsored transborder abduction does not divest the court of 
jurisdiction).  The Ninth Circuit was troubled by the outcome that they were compelled to reach 
but nevertheless had to rely on the precedent of Alvarez-Machain throughout the decision: 
While it may seem unconscionable to some that officials serving the interests of justice 
themselves become agents of criminal intimidation, like the DEA agents in Alvarez-
Machain, their purported actions have violated no recognized constitutional or statutory 
rights.  They have likewise engaged in no illegal conduct which this court could attempt 
to deter in the future . . . . 
Id. at 763-64.  “Matta-Ballestero’s abduction, even if we labeled it a ‘kidnapping,’ does not 
violate recognized constitutional or statutory provisions in light of Alvarez-Machain.”  Id. at 764 
n.5. 
 147. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650-53 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule to 
unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 490 (1966) (applying exclusionary rule to the privilege against self-incrimination under the 
Fifth Amendment); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964) (applying exclusionary 
rule to the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323-
24 (1959) (applying exclusionary rule to the due process clause). 
 148. See infra notes 174-205 and accompanying text.  Critics of the exclusionary rule 
proclaim it as “an all-or-nothing remedy,” that it only offers a benefit to the guilty, and that it 
results in a huge loss in convictions.  Barry F. Shanks, Comparative Analysis of the Exclusionary 
Rule and its Alternatives, 57 TUL. L. REV. 648, 657-58 (1983).  However, as the Mapp Court 
reasoned when applying the exclusionary rule: 
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that 
which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which 
honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary 
in the true administration of justice. 
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660. 
 149. See Mapp, 367 U.S. 643. 
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property owned by an alien and located in a foreign country.150  The Court 
reasoned that the textual structure of the Amendment “suggests that ‘the 
people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . refers to a class of persons 
who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed 
sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that 
community.”151  Because Verdugo-Urquidez was a citizen of Mexico and the 
search took place in Mexico, the Fourth Amendment did not apply.152 
Thus, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a transborder abduction 
case like Alvarez-Machain because it does not protect aliens or evidence 
abroad.  Even if Verdugo-Urquidez did not exist, the Supreme Court has held 
that suppression of a defendant’s person is not an appropriate remedy for a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.153  As the issue in forcible transborder 
abductions is a jurisdictional matter and the only thing to suppress is the 
defendant’s person, the exclusionary rule does not help a victim such as 
Alvarez-Machain. 
B. Offensive Remedies 
The offensive remedies available are for monetary compensation under the 
Alien Tort Claims Act154 and the Federal Tort Claims Act.155  Although both 
statutes are available, there is no significant difference between the two from 
the standpoint of individuals such as Alvarez-Machain because both provide an 
after-the-fact monetary remedy. 
1. Alien Tort Claims Act 
The Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”) is a federal jurisdictional statute that 
provides a private cause of action where a plaintiff can establish a municipal 
tort and a violation of the law of nations or a treaty.156  Specifically, the statute 
currently provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
 
 150. 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990). 
 151. Id. at 265. 
 152. Id. at 274-75. 
 153. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984) (holding that the body of the 
defendant is not a suppressible fruit of an unlawful arrest); United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 
474 (1980) (finding that the defendant is not a suppressible fruit). 
 154. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
 155. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (2000). 
 156. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).  The constitutional foundation for jurisdiction under the ATCA 
is that the cases “arise under” federal law.  For a more detailed discussion of the ATCA, see 
generally Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: Inquiries 
into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1 (1985); Kenneth C. Randall, Further 
Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute and a Recommendation, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 473 
(1986) [hereinafter Further Inquiries]. 
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nations or a treaty of the United States.”157  The statute was originally a 
provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and prior to 1980, courts had only 
sustained jurisdiction under the statute twice.158 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala was the first case to successfully invoke the statute 
in the human rights context.159  In that case, the Filartigas, who were 
Paraguayan citizens residing in the United States, brought an action against 
Pena-Irala, also a citizen of Paraguay, for causing the wrongful death of their 
son and brother, Joelito.160  The Filartigas claimed that Joelito was kidnapped, 
tortured, and killed in retaliation for his father’s political activism.161  The 
Filartiga court found that torture violated the law of nations due to the 
universal condemnation of torture in international agreements and the 
renunciation of torture as an official policy by almost all nations of the 
world.162  The court explained that it was not granting new rights to aliens but 
was “opening the federal courts for adjudication of the rights already 
recognized by international law.”163 
An important part of the Filartiga decision was based on how customary 
international law fits into U.S. domestic law.  Quoting The Paquete Habana, 
the court recognized that “‘[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be 
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate 
 
 157. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).  Both state and non-state actors (including corporate actors, 
state officials, and individuals) can be sued for certain offenses under the ATCA.  Further 
Inquiries, supra note 156, at 495-512.  However, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the 
Federal Tort Claims Act make it more difficult to bring a claim against foreign states or the 
United States.  Id. at 507-11. 
 158. Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 865 (D. Md. 1961); Bolchos v. 
Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607). 
 159. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).  Opponents to the expansive view of the ATCA have 
criticized the Filartiga line of decisions for their “flawed reasoning and ‘inappropriate leniency in 
allowing U.S. courts jurisdiction over international human rights cases.’”  Kathleen M. Kedian, 
Note, Customary International Law and International Human Rights Litigation in United States 
Courts: Revitalizing the Legacy of The Paquete Habana, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1395, 1411-12 
(1999).  However: 
[R]etreating to an isolationist view that shelters courts from making decisions based on 
customary international law is an unsettling solution . . . .  On the other hand,  . . .  
reiterating the authority of federal courts to rule on claims based on customary 
international law would enable courts to carry out their responsibility for protecting the 
powerless, salvage the United States’s reputation for fostering individual liberty, 
demonstrate an eagerness to participate in global accountability, and move the country 
confidently into the future. 
Id. at 1425.  For a more detailed discussion of the ATCA in the human rights realm, see Beth 
Stephens, Human Rights Accountability: Congress, Federalism and International Law, 6 ILSA J. 
INT’L & COMP. L 277 (2000). 
 160. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 880. 
 163. Id. at 887. 
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jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented 
for their determination.’”164  As the Filartiga court noted, “it is clear that 
courts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has 
evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.”165  In holding that 
torture was a violation of the law of nations, the court compared the torturer to 
the pirate and slave trader and noted that all were “an enemy of all 
mankind.”166 
Since Filartiga was decided, district courts have been increasingly willing 
to accept jurisdiction under the ATCA.  In addition, the district courts have 
recognized summary execution, disappearance, arbitrary detention, and cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment as violations of the law of nations.167  On the 
other hand, the Alvarez-Machain court found that there was not an 
international norm against transborder abductions, but that every abduction 
violates the prohibition against arbitrary arrest.168  Therefore, a victim who has 
been forcibly abducted from another country can bring a claim under the 
ATCA for any of the aforementioned reasons; however, in order to get relief 
for the abduction, the victim must claim that the arrest and detention were 
arbitrary, rather than claiming that the abduction itself violates the law of 
nations. 
2. Federal Tort Claims Act 
The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) provides a limited waiver against 
the sovereign immunity of the United States when one of its employees 
commits certain torts.169  The statute grants exclusive jurisdiction to the district 
courts on claims against the United States for money damages relating to tort 
 
 164. Id.  (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).  Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court observed in The Paquete Habana that ascertaining customary international law 
involves “resort  . . .  to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to 
the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have 
made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.”  The Paquete 
Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. 
 165. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881. 
 166. Id. at 890. 
 167. E.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 186 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding that summary 
execution, disappearance, torture, arbitrary detention, and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
violated international law); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541-42 (N.D. Cal. 1987) 
(finding prolonged arbitrary detention and summary execution violated the law of nations). 
 168. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 617 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).  The 
Ninth Circuit essentially fit transborder abductions under the label of arbitrary arrest and 
detention so that any transborder abduction will violate the law of nations in that it constitutes an 
arbitrary arrest and detention. 
 169. 28 U.S.C. §§1346(b), 2674 (2000).  The FTCA does not “create any new governmental 
liability” and only applies to “existing causes of action.” Thomas A. Kantas, Maximizing Your 
Client’s Recovery Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 91 ILL. B.J. 76, 76 (2003). 
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claims.170  However, there are several exceptions to the FTCA in which 
sovereign immunity is not waived.171  The foreign activities exception 
prohibits recovery in claims “arising in a foreign country,” and the intentional 
torts exception excludes certain intentional torts except when committed by 
“investigative or law enforcement officers.”172  Thus, a victim of a forcible 
transborder abduction will have a cause of action under the FTCA against the 
United States if the claim does not arise in a foreign country and the intentional 
tort is committed by an investigative or law enforcement officer. 
V.  DEFENSIVE AND/OR OFFENSIVE REMEDY IN LIGHT OF POLICY RATIONALES 
There are two remedial mechanisms available to an individual like 
Alvarez-Machain: 1) a dismissal of the indictment with or without monetary 
compensation; or 2) a criminal trial followed by a civil suit for compensatory 
damages.173 Although the exclusionary rule does not apply to forcible 
transborder abduction cases, the policy objectives mentioned by the Supreme 
Court in various opinions apply differently to defensive and offensive 
remedies.  The foundation of these holdings is found in Weeks v. United 
States.174  “[I]t is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, 
personal liberty, and private property, where that right has never been forfeited 
by his conviction of some public offense,—it is the invasion of this sacred 
right” that requires the courts to remedy the government’s misconduct.175 
This Part will analyze Supreme Court cases in light of policy goals and 
will apply those goals to both a defensive (dismissal of the indictment) and 
offensive (monetary compensation) remedy in Alvarez-Machain.  Specifically, 
the policy goals of judicial integrity, deterrence of government misconduct, 
and victim compensation strongly favor dismissal of the indictment.  The two 
main objections to dismissal are that it undermines law enforcement and 
exceeds judicial power.  This Part will rebut these arguments by showing that 
effective law enforcement is not undermined by dismissal because extradition 
exists as an effective mechanism and that dismissal as a remedy does not 
exceed judicial power because it is within the judicial branch’s powers to 
provide such a remedy. 
 
 170. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (2000). 
 171. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2000). 
 172. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), (k) (2000). 
 173. See infra notes 174-264 and accompanying text.  The United States could offer both a 
defensive and offensive remedy for transborder abductions, as various international bodies have 
suggested.  Nevertheless, a defensive remedy alone is sufficient in most cases.  On the other hand, 
an offensive remedy should not be the exclusive remedy for reasons that will be shown. 
 174. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 175. Id. at 391. 
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A. Upholds Judicial Integrity 
In his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States,176 Justice Brandeis 
argued passionately for judicial integrity as a reason that evidence should be 
excluded.  In Olmstead, the government wiretapped telephone lines in the 
defendant’s home and office.177  The information gathered through the taped 
conversations was admitted into evidence and ultimately led to a conviction 
against the defendant.178  Although the majority of the Supreme Court held that 
the wiretapping did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the decision was later 
overruled by Berger v. New York.179  Justice Brandeis wrote a compelling, oft-
cited dissenting opinion in Olmstead, arguing that the evidence should be 
inadmissible for a violation of the Fourth Amendment.180 
Justice Brandeis reasoned that if the Court allowed the government to 
punish the defendant through illegal means, the Court itself would be ratifying 
the illegal actions and the government would become a lawbreaker.181  He 
declared that it was the duty of the courts not only to protect individuals from 
unreasonable government intrusions, but also to protect the government from 
itself: 
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it 
fails to observe the law scrupulously.  Our Government is the potent, the 
omnipresent teacher.  For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its 
example.  Crime is contagious.  If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it 
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it 
invites anarchy.  To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the 
end justifies the means—to declare that the Government may commit crimes in 
order to secure the conviction of a private criminal—would bring terrible 
retribution.  Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its 
face.182 
 
 176. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 177. Id. at 456-57. 
 178. Id. at 457. 
 179. 388 U.S. 41, 62-64 (1967). 
 180. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 471-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  The passage was cited by the 
dissenting opinion in Alvarez-Machain.  Justice Stevens observed that even though Alvarez-
Machain participated in a “brutal murder” of an American law enforcement agent, “[s]uch an 
explanation  . . .  provides no justification for disregarding the Rule of Law that this Court has a 
duty to uphold.” United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 686 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 181. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  The Weeks court used a similar line 
of reasoning in finding that government misconduct (unlawful searches) “should find no sanction 
in the judgments of the courts, which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution, 
and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such 
fundamental rights.” Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). 
 182. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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Therefore, Justice Brandeis acknowledged that it is the responsibility of the 
courts to uphold the integrity of the judicial process by preventing the 
government from using illegal means to convict a criminal. 
Furthermore, even though a transborder abduction is an international law 
violation, the judicial integrity of the courts is implicated as much by these 
violations as when a constitutional law violation occurs.  This is so because a 
violation has occurred, regardless of whether it is an international or 
constitutional law violation, and a remedy should be provided.183  As Chief 
Justice Marshall so wisely stated: 
It is a settled and invariable principle, that every right, when withheld, must 
have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress. 
. . . . 
The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a 
government of laws, and not of men.  It will certainly cease to deserve this 
high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested 
legal right.184 
Even though international law is implicated by transborder abductions, the 
principle remains the same—where there is a right, there is a remedy.185  Thus, 
it is the duty of the courts to provide this remedy so that the right is 
protected.186 
Dismissal of the indictment for transborder abductions would most 
certainly uphold judicial integrity.  The judicial integrity of the Supreme Court 
and the courts of the United States was seriously questioned after the Alvarez-
Machain decision came down in 1992.  Legal scholars, international 
organizations, and other countries condemned the decision.187  The Supreme 
Court’s decision, in effect, sanctioned the violation of Mexico’s territorial 
integrity and Alvarez-Machain’s personal rights. 
The dissent, however, recognized that the Court’s integrity was at stake 
and quoted Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States.188  If the courts 
sanction lawless conduct, they become accomplices in the “‘willful 
disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold.’”189  As Justice 
 
 183. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147, 163 (1803). 
 184. Id. 
 185. This idea, also stated as the legal maxim ubi jus ibi remedium, “forms the bedrock of our 
system of justice.” United States v. Pena-Gonzalez, 62 F. Supp. 2d 358, 365 (D.P.R. 1999). 
 186. In fact, the courts are “duty-bound to construct an effective remedy tailored to the 
injury. . . .  [A] grave violation merits an equally weighty remedy.”  Id. 
 187. See Aceves, supra note 10; see also supra notes 78-106 and accompanying text. 
 188. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 687 n.33 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 189. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 
318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943)). 
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Stevens correctly noted, by sanctioning the government’s conduct in Alvarez-
Machain, the Court imperiled the perception of its judicial integrity throughout 
its own country and the world.190  Accordingly, dismissal of the indictment and 
a denial of in personam jurisdiction uphold judicial integrity. 
On the other hand, an offensive remedy does very little to uphold judicial 
integrity because the courts would still have in personam jurisdiction over the 
defendant.  An offensive remedy, without more, effectively condones 
government misconduct because it allows the government to keep the fruits of 
its illegality.  It might compensate the victim monetarily, but this fact alone 
does not uphold the judicial integrity of the courts.  The courts would become a 
party to the wrongdoing by upholding a constitutional violation and allowing 
the government to simply pay off the victim.  Therefore, dismissal of the 
indictment with or without monetary compensation is the best remedy to 
maintain the highest level of judicial integrity. 
B. Deters Government Misconduct 
Another important policy goal is deterrence of government and police 
misconduct.  As Justice Stewart asserted in Elkins v. United States, “[t]he rule 
is calculated to prevent, not to repair.  Its purpose is to deter—to compel 
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—
by removing the incentive to disregard it.”191  In Elkins, the state unlawfully 
seized evidence from the defendant’s home.192  After a state prosecution failed 
due to the illegality of the search, the state turned the evidence over to federal 
officials and a federal indictment followed.193  The Supreme Court held that 
evidence obtained by state officers during a search, which if conducted by 
federal officers would violate the defendant’s rights under the Fourth 
Amendment, is inadmissible.194 
The Court reasoned that only the most flagrant police abuses come to the 
attention of the courts and that in order to protect the innocent against such 
invasions, evidence must be excluded against those who are guilty.195  Indeed, 
as Judge Cardozo stated in People v. Defore, “[t]he criminal is to go free 
because the constable has blundered.”196  Thus, a legitimate policy goal of the 
 
 190. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 687-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 191. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217. 
 192. Id. at 206-07 
 193. Id. at 207 n.1. 
 194. Id. at 223. 
 195. Id. at 217-18. 
 196. 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).  The Elkins majority opinion also quoted Professor 
Wigmore’s adage: 
‘Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a lottery; Flavius, you have confessedly 
violated the constitution.  Titus ought to suffer imprisonment for crime, and Flavius for 
contempt.  But no!  We shall let you both go free.  We shall not punish Flavius directly, 
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Supreme Court is to deter police misconduct, and if a case is dismissed 
because of the exclusion of evidence, it is the government’s misconduct that 
sets the criminal free, not the courts. 
Dismissal of the indictment would deter government misconduct because if 
the agents knew that the court would lack jurisdiction once the defendant was 
brought into the country, they would use the formal extradition process rather 
than simply abducting the suspect.  Justice Stevens also warned of the possible 
repercussions of the majority’s opinion in Alvarez-Machain.  “If the United 
States, for example, thought it more expedient to torture or simply to execute a 
person rather than to attempt extradition, these options would be equally 
available because they, too, were not explicitly prohibited . . . .”197  As it stands 
now after Alvarez-Machain and subsequent cases, the DEA and other agencies 
have no disincentives to forcibly abduct a wanted criminal.198  Nevertheless, if 
the Court would have followed Justice Stevens’s line of argument, 
governmental misconduct and forcible abductions would have to stop because 
United States courts would not have jurisdiction over the defendant once in the 
United States.  Thus, a defensive remedy for transborder abductions would 
deter government misconduct. 
On the other hand, an offensive remedy, without more, would do very little 
to deter government misconduct.  An offensive remedy by itself would allow 
the government to pay the victim after-the-fact for its illegal action.  Thus, if 
the government valued the defendant’s apprehension more than it valued 
international law, it could elect to act in violation of international law and pay 
damages.  Where gain exceeds harm to the suspect, the government could 
violate international law, abduct the suspect and simply pay damages at a later 
date.  As such, dismissal of the indictment for transborder abductions would be 
better at deterring government misconduct than an offensive remedy standing 
alone. 
 
but shall do so by reversing Titus’ conviction.  This is our way of teaching people like 
Flavius to behave, and of teaching people like Titus to behave, and incidentally of 
securing respect for the Constitution.  Our way of upholding the Constitution is not to 
strike at the man who breaks it, but to let off somebody else who broke something else.’ 
Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217. 
 197. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 674 (1992). 
 198. E.g., United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming 
conviction of Honduran citizen who was tried in federal court after being abducted by U.S. 
government agents from his home in Honduras); United States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277 
(11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1038 (2002) (finding that dismissal of the indictment was 
not appropriate after DEA agents lured Duarte-Acero, a Colombian national, into Ecuador where 
Ecuadorian police arrested him and turned him over to the DEA). 
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C. Provides Compensation to Victims 
In Bivens, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics arrested the defendant 
in his apartment in front of his wife and children and threatened to arrest the 
entire family.199  In addition, the agents searched the entire apartment and 
subjected the defendant to a visual strip search.200  He sought damages because 
the arrest and search were effected without a warrant and unreasonable force 
was used during the arrest.201  The Supreme Court held that Bivens could 
recover damages for violations of the Fourth Amendment upon proof of 
injuries sustained from federal agents’ actions.202 
The Court reasoned that the only protection available to an individual in 
that situation is afforded by the judiciary because the sole alternative is 
resistance to the officer’s asserted authority, and this might amount to a 
crime.203  The Court noted that damages were the historical remedy for 
violations of personal liberty and security and that it was the judiciary’s 
responsibility to vindicate such rights.204  Furthermore, “‘[t]he very essence of 
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the 
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.’”205  In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Harlan explained that compensatory relief is appropriate even 
where it will have little deterrent effect because it might be the only remedy to 
an innocent victim, to whom the exclusionary rule would not apply.206  Thus, 
the Bivens Court held that an individual could recover money damages for 
violations of constitutional rights. 
A defensive remedy for transborder abductions would not compensate the 
victim monetarily.  However, it would compensate the victim in the sense that 
he gains his freedom and liberty through dismissal of the indictment.  It is 
probable that any victim who was abducted would prefer the restoration of life 
and liberty, rather than monetary compensation.  A defensive remedy helps 
restore the victim’s intangible rights, which are impossible to value 
monetarily.207 
 
 199. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
389 (1971). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 389-90. 
 202. Id. at 397. 
 203. Id. at 394-95. 
 204. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395, 407. 
 205. Id. at 397 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)). 
 206. Id. at 408-10 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 207. Although a defensive remedy can help restore intangible rights, it would be impossible 
to completely restore them as these lost rights include pain, suffering, humiliation and 
embarrassment, which can never be recovered. Thomas M. Antkowiak, Note, Truth as Right and 
Remedy in International Human Rights Experience, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 977, 1008 (2002). 
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An offensive remedy obviously compensates the victim through damages.  
A victim can get damages in return for the violation of his rights.  However, it 
is almost impossible to think that monetary compensation alone can 
completely compensate the victim for the violation of his personal rights, the 
pain and suffering, and the humiliation that the forcible abduction caused.  
Damages also present a separate problem with valuation.  How can a court put 
a value on a victim’s personal liberty and human rights?  Even if an offensive 
remedy compensates a victim more than a defensive remedy in a monetary 
sense, it cannot restore a victim’s intangible rights like dismissal of the 
indictment.  Thus, dismissal of the indictment with or without monetary 
compensation adequately compensates the victim, whereas an offensive 
remedy, without more, does not. 
D. Undermines Law Enforcement 
The government argues that dismissal of the indictment undermines 
effective law enforcement because it allows the criminal to go free.  However, 
“the criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.”208  In addition, 
extradition treaties exist as an effective and legal mechanism for capturing 
criminals in another country.209  The Attorney General’s Annual Report states 
that: 
Working jointly with foreign counterparts is a realistic way to achieve the 
goals of dismantling international criminal organizations, locating fugitives, 
and establishing mutually recognized processes for ensuring criminals are 
brought to justice primarily through the extradition process . . . .  [Extradition] 
treaties provide the means to bring fugitives to justice and supply evidence 
necessary to support criminal investigations and prosecutions.210 
Because a legal means exists via extradition treaties, there is no reason to 
resort to extra-legal means such as abduction; as such, dismissal of the 
indictment does not undermine effective law enforcement. 
 
 208. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926). 
 209. More specifically: 
Extradition is a mechanism that allows the prosecution of a crime—even when the suspect 
escapes to another country—without jeopardizing the human rights of the citizens of that 
neighboring country.  The extradition procedure protects the individual rights of the 
extraditable person because it always requires a hearing before a judge of the requested 
nation. 
Ruiz-Bravo, supra note 37, at 840.  In addition to protecting the individual’s rights, extradition 
preserves the sovereignty and territoriality of the countries involved by “providing a legal channel 
for two nation-states to confer with one another in order to properly exercise jurisdiction over an 
individual charged with a crime.” Aimee Lee, Comment, United States v. Alvarez-Machain: The 
Deleterious Ramifications of Illegal Abductions, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 126, 130 (1993). 
 210. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 2002 PERFORMANCE REPORT & FISCAL YEAR 
2003 REVISED FINAL PERFORMANCE PLAN, FISCAL YEAR 2004 PERFORMANCE PLAN 33-34 
(2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2002/pdf/FullReport.pdf. 
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The Supreme Court has considered the fact that in many cases law 
enforcement would be undermined by the exclusionary rule and has become 
more reluctant to apply the exclusionary rule in certain instances due to this 
rationale.211  However, the cases in which the Supreme Court has held that the 
exclusionary rule is inapplicable have involved minor invasions that were 
limited in scope and extent, like the Terry stop.212  In these cases, the Court 
balances the intrusiveness of the police actions against the necessity of 
obtaining the evidence.213  If this balancing test were applied to a transborder 
abduction case, the intrusiveness of the abduction would far outweigh the 
necessity of obtaining the suspect since a legal and less intrusive means exists 
through an extradition treaty.214 
Moreover, the Supreme Court considered whether the exclusionary rule 
had rendered the administration of criminal justice ineffective in Mapp v. Ohio 
when it decided to extend the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment to 
the states.215  The Court found that the federal criminal justice system had not 
been rendered ineffective since it began operating under the exclusionary rule 
in Weeks almost fifty years earlier.216  Furthermore, “‘the history of the 
criminal law proves that tolerance of shortcut methods in law enforcement 
impairs its enduring effectiveness.’”217  Thus, the Court recognized that 
effective law enforcement does not rest solely on obtaining convictions, but 
also on respecting the constitutional boundaries within which the government 
 
 211. E.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (applying the good faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394 (1985) (holding that the 
exclusionary rule does not apply to warrantless search of motor home); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
21 (1968) (holding that a law enforcement officer can stop and frisk a suspect on reasonable 
suspicion). 
 212. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has consistently held that “[i]n the home . . . all 
details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.” 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).  By analogy, because the home is such a sacred 
place, it would seem that the Court would be repulsed by the kidnapping of an individual, whose 
personal rights were completely ignored. 
 213. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-37 
(1967)). 
 214. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (finding that less intrusive means existed in 
which the police officers could have carried out the search). 
 215. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 216. Id. at 659-60.  The Elkins court made a similar finding only one year earlier concerning 
application of the exclusionary rule in the federal criminal justice system: “the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation has [not] thereby been rendered ineffective, [and] the administration of criminal 
justice in the federal courts has [not] thereby been disrupted.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 
206, 218 (1960). 
 217. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 658 (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958)). 
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and its agents must operate.218  Because extradition treaties are an effective and 
legal means of apprehending criminals abroad, there is no reason that the 
government or its agents should operate outside the boundaries of these 
treaties. 
Nevertheless, the government has been hesitant to rely on extradition 
treaties under a mistaken belief that extradition treaties are ineffective.  This 
causes states to resort to irregular forms of rendition to apprehend a criminal 
living abroad.219  Professor Bassiouni has elaborated some of the policy 
considerations that go into a determination of whether to use an extradition 
treaty: 
[1.] The extraditable offenses listed in the treaty may not cover the 
specific offense. 
[2.] Political and practical considerations in given cases may require a 
political compromise among states concerning persons beyond the respective 
reach of each state or in the respective custody of each of the given states. 
[3.] Commencement of formal proceedings is likely to give notice to the 
fugitive and time to flee the jurisdiction of the state of refuge. 
[4.] The length of the formal process further delayed by appeals and 
collateral attack dilutes its certainty and swiftness. 
[5.] The cost of extradition for both states is often significant. 
[6.] The weaknesses of the requesting state’s case at the time extradition 
is sought may be a bar to it. 
[7.] The requesting state may find it necessary to withhold some of the 
evidence against the fugitive for trial strategy or other reasons. 
[8.] Exceptions and exemptions such as the political offense exception 
may contribute to the dilution of the effectiveness of the process.220 
Therefore, a country may sometimes resort to an illegitimate process because it 
thinks that abduction is the only efficient way to apprehend the suspect.221 
 
 218. Respecting constitutional boundaries also means respecting treaty obligations because 
Article VI states that “all Treaties made . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. CONST. 
art. VI. 
 219. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 249-311. 
 220. Id. at 308-09 (renumbered from original). 
 221. It has been argued that irregular rendition should only be used in extreme cases where 
the crime is especially heinous and serious and when the asylum state has refused to punish or 
extradite.  Jimmy Gurule, Terrorism, Territorial Sovereignty, and the Forcible Apprehension of 
International Criminals Abroad, 17 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 457, 490-92 (1994).  In 
addition, the abduction should be directly approved by the Attorney General to ensure that 
“proper consideration would be given to foreign policy concerns and would provide for a 
comprehensive risk-benefit assessment at the highest levels of government.”  Id. at 492.  
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However, the process of irregular rendition, especially in the case of a 
forcible abduction without state consent, is not necessarily more effective than 
the formal extradition process because the consequences of the abduction 
outweigh the efficiency of the apprehension.  By kidnapping an alien from 
another country, the state disrupts world order, violates the infringed-upon 
state’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and legal processes and damages the 
integrity of the international process.222  In addition, the kidnapping violates 
the abducted person’s right to freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, as 
well as international due process and fairness.223  As Professor Bassiouni 
states, “[t]he practical considerations of justifying invalid means by a 
purportedly valid end must be rejected.”224  And, because an effective means 
for detaining suspects exists through extradition treaties, there is no reason to 
turn to the invalid means of kidnapping. 
Abduction also is not an effective means of capturing a criminal because 
the abducting government’s reputation is damaged in the international 
community, and future efforts at international cooperation are hindered.  In 
fact, this has proven true in United States-Mexico relations after the Supreme 
Court decided Alvarez-Machain in 1992.  Despite the two thousand mile 
common border that the states share, no major Mexican drug trafficker was 
ever extradited to stand trial in the United States before 2001, and the decision 
in Alvarez-Machain only strengthened the Mexican government’s resentment 
and mistrust of the United States government.225  Because this is true and 
because Mexico requested the repatriation of Alvarez-Machain immediately 
after his abduction, dismissal of the indictment would not undermine law 
 
Nonetheless, in Alvarez-Machain the United States never requested Mexico to extradite the 
suspect, and Mexico did not refuse to punish him; the Attorney General did not authorize or 
approve the abduction; and although the crime was serious and heinous, there wasn’t even 
sufficient evidence to convict Alvarez-Machain in court.  Still yet, the best policy is to prohibit all 
transborder abductions in all circumstances, which would force more reliance on extradition 
treaties.  Michael J. Glennon, State-Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on United States v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 746, 755 (1992). 
 222. BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 309-10. 
 223. Id. at 310. 
 224. Id. at 311.  If an extradition request fails for whatever reason, the solution should not be 
to forcibly abduct an individual.  As Professor Bassiouni explains: 
The solution, however, should be to make extradition more efficient, not to subvert it by 
resorting to unlawful or legally questionable means. . . . At this stage in the development 
of international law, it is no longer possible to rationalize violations of international law 
on grounds of expediency or to allow such violations to be perpetrated without an 
adequate deterrent-remedy. 
Id. at 251. 
 225. Rishi Hingoraney, Note, International Extradition of Mexican Narcotics Traffickers: 
Prospects and Pitfalls for the New Millennium, 30 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 331, 331, 351 (2002). 
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enforcement, as it would strengthen the abducting government’s reputation 
within the international community.226 
In addition, a defensive remedy would further international cooperation in 
the apprehension of foreign criminals because nation states would have to 
work together through pre-existing extradition treaties.  The Attorney 
General’s Report recognizes that extradition treaties “forge strong law 
enforcement relationships between the U.S. and other countries, and they 
convey an obligation to assist in international extradition.”227  The Report 
further states that international cooperation is “critical to addressing the 
dramatic growth in the scope of transnational crime,” thus recognizing the 
substantial benefits that extradition has over unilateral actions like 
abduction.228 
Extradition treaties have been effective and useful in the past and continue 
to be so today.  In fact, only two extradition requests were turned down by the 
State Department of the United States in a period of twenty-one years.229  As 
John Kester noted, “[t]here is no reason to believe that the percentage is any 
different today.”230  These high statistics of cooperation through extradition 
treaties are likely the same throughout the world, especially when a country is 
dealing with a request from the United States because extradition candidates 
“can become unattractive pawns in global geopolitics.”231  Thus, extradition is 
 
 226. Analisa W. Scrimger, Comment, United States v. Alvarez-Machain: Forcible Abduction 
as an Acceptable Alternative Means of Gaining Jurisdiction, 7 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 369, 
388-90 (1993). 
 227. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 210, at 34. 
 228. Id. at 33.  The number of extradition requests also demonstrates how important 
international cooperation is within the international community when it comes to capturing 
criminals.  In Fiscal Year 1992, there were only 842 extradition requests, whereas there were 
3,923 requests in Fiscal Year 2000.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 2000 PERFORMANCE 
REPORT AND FISCAL YEAR 2002 PERFORMANCE PLAN 17 (2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/ 
annualreports/pr2000/TableofContents.htm.  Furthermore, the U.S. State Department sends out 
many more extradition requests every year than it receives.  In Fiscal Year 2002, 269 fugitives 
were surrendered to the United States, while 102 fugitives were surrendered from the U.S.  U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 210, at 34. 
 229. Kester, supra note 5, at 1486. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 1487.  Kester further argues: 
If a foreign country wants a United States resident badly, and that country can or does 
provide something else—say, a military base or a trade agreement—that the United States 
would like to have, one individual (who it is easy to assume is probably guilty, anyway) 
may be a cheap price to pay, in the minds of United States diplomats, to help secure a 
more important end. 
Id.  This applies with equal force when the United States is the requesting country because the 
U.S. can use humanitarian aid or military assistance as a bargaining tool.  For an example of how 
the United States has recently used aid as a coercive bargaining tool in international relations, 
look no further than the bilateral immunity agreements that many countries reluctantly signed 
with the United States concerning the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction.  See, e.g., 
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an effective mechanism for capturing a suspect; consequently, dismissal of the 
indictment would not undermine law enforcement. 
While an offensive remedy does not undermine effective law enforcement, 
it certainly does not strengthen law enforcement mechanisms.  Although a 
court would maintain jurisdiction over a criminal and the government could 
succeed in prosecution, an offensive remedy, without more, effectively excuses 
lawless action.  By doing this, it makes the United States appear to be above 
the law, as the courts have jurisdiction over a defendant regardless of whether 
the government forcibly abducted him or chose to rely on the formal 
extradition process.  This, in turn, hampers cooperation between nations in 
apprehending suspects and ultimately leads to less effective law enforcement 
because other nations would not be willing to work with the United States in 
international criminal law issues. 
Furthermore, an offensive remedy, without more, fails to secure 
compliance with constitutional and international law because it encourages 
illegal abductions by allowing a court to retain jurisdiction regardless of how 
the suspect was apprehended.  As the Elkins court stated, “‘[e]xperience has 
demonstrated . . . that neither administrative, criminal nor civil remedies are 
effective in suppressing lawless searches and seizures.’”232  Thus, dismissal of 
the indictment is the only remedy that will stop transborder abductions and it 
will not undermine law enforcement efforts because extradition is an efficient 
mechanism to apprehend foreign criminals. 
E. Limits on Judicial Power 
Judicial restraint is another concern of the courts because the judiciary 
does not sit to question political decisions.233  Courts are skeptical of becoming 
involved in cases dealing with international relations and international law 
because they do not want to overstep their boundaries and question policy 
choices constitutionally committed to the Executive Branch or Congress.234  As 
such, when a potential treaty violation has occurred, the Judicial Branch is 
cautious in its decision and often defers to the views of the Executive 
 
Remigius Chibueze, United States Objection to the International Criminal Court: A Paradox of 
“Operation Enduring Freedom,” 9 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 19 (2003); Benjamin B. 
Ferencz, Misguided Fears About the International Criminal Court, 15 PACE INT’L L. REV. 223, 
230-46 (2003); Bungling Bully: Strong-Arm Diplomacy is Damaging US Interests Abroad, FIN. 
TIMES (London), July 3, 2003, at 18. 
 232. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 220 (1960) (quoting People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 
905, 911-13 (Cal. 1955)). 
 233. The political question doctrine prohibits courts from examining government actions that 
are “mere political act[s].” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 164 (1803). 
 234. See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986). 
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Branch.235  Nevertheless, courts have the “authority to construe treaties,” 
which is a “recurring and accepted task for the federal courts.”236  The question 
of whether or not the courts should intervene and provide a remedy has been a 
recurring issue in many cases dealing with a foreigner’s rights under the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.237 
In Breard v. Greene, the defendant, a citizen of Paraguay, was convicted of 
murder and attempted rape and sentenced to death.238  In 1996, Breard filed a 
motion for habeas relief claiming that his convictions and sentence should be 
overturned because he had never been notified of his right to contact the 
Paraguayan Consulate, a violation of the Vienna Convention.239  The Republic 
of Paraguay instituted proceedings in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
against the United States for violations of the Vienna Convention at the time of 
Breard’s arrest.240  The ICJ issued an order requesting the United States to 
“‘take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not 
executed pending the final decision in these proceedings.’”241  Nevertheless, 
the Supreme Court denied relief and held that Breard procedurally defaulted 
his claim by failing to raise it in the state court.242 
The Court reasoned that under principles of international law, the 
procedural rules of the forum state govern the implementation of a treaty and 
that under United States procedural law, Breard was required to assert his 
Vienna Convention claim in state court.243  The Court, in dictum, stated that 
even if a Vienna Convention claim were properly raised in state court 
proceedings, it is “extremely doubtful” that the violation would result in 
reversing the conviction without a finding that the violation had an effect on 
the trial.244 
 
 235. E.g., Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United Parcel Serv., 177 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 
1999); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 
(1961) (“While courts interpret treaties for themselves, the meaning given them by the 
departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is given 
great weight.”); but see Tachiona v. Mugabe, 186 F. Supp. 2d 383, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he 
theory [of deference to the Executive Branch’s interpretation] makes a mockery of constitutional 
separation of powers.  Manifestly, its effectuation would spell doom for judicial independence.”). 
 236. Japan Whaling Ass’n, 478 U.S. at 230. 
 237. Vienna Convention, supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 238. 523 U.S. 371, 373 (1998). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 374. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 375. 
 243. Breard, 523 U.S. at 375-76. 
 244. Id. at 377. 
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Regrettably, the Supreme Court never even considered the ICJ’s request to 
delay execution until the proceedings were complete.245  The Court found that 
it was within the executive branch’s power to stay the execution, and that the 
judiciary did not have the power to do so based on existing statutes or case 
law.246  Thus, relying on judicial restraint, the Court would not consider the 
ICJ’s request because it involved foreign relations and would violate the 
separation of powers.247 
However, the Supreme Court did not impose similar judicial restraint on 
itself in the case of Cook v. United States.248  In Cook, a treaty between the 
United States and Great Britain allowed the search of a vessel within a state’s 
territorial waters, which was defined as one hour’s traveling distance measured 
by the maximum speed of the seized vessel.249  Although the treaty mentioned 
compensation, it did not expressly mention a defense to a fine.  The United 
States Coast Guard boarded a British vessel, which was capable of traveling 
ten miles per hour, 11.5 miles from the United States coast and seized 
intoxicating liquor.250  Even though the seizure took place outside the agreed 
upon distance, the ship’s master was fined $14,286.18 for failure to include 
liquor in the ship’s manifest.251 
The Supreme Court allowed the ship’s master to assert the treaty as a 
defense and held that the treaty violation deprived the court of jurisdiction: 
The objection to the seizure is not that it was wrongful merely because made 
by one upon whom the government had not conferred authority to seize at the 
place where the seizure was made.  The objection is that the government itself 
lacked power to seize, since by the Treaty it had imposed a territorial limitation 
upon its own authority. . . .  Our government, lacking power to seize, lacked 
power, because of the Treaty, to subject the vessel to our laws.  To hold that 
adjudication may follow a wrongful seizure would go far to nullify the purpose 
and effect of the Treaty.252 
Thus, the Supreme Court allowed Cook to defensively invoke the treaty and 
dismissed the case. 
 
 245. The Supreme Court’s opinion was announced less than one hour before Breard’s 
execution was scheduled.  The execution was able to be carried out on time, thus giving 
absolutely no weight or deference to the ICJ’s opinion or Breard’s rights.  Ray, supra note 117, at 
1744. 
 246. Breard, 523 U.S. at 378. 
 247. For reasons why the Supreme Court should have considered the ICJ’s request, see 
Justices Stevens’ and Breyer’s dissenting opinions in the denial of certiorari in Torres v. Mullin, 
124 S.Ct. 562 (2003).  See also supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text. 
 248. 288 U.S. 102 (1933). 
 249. Id. at 110-11. 
 250. Id. at 107. 
 251. Id. at 108. 
 252. Id. at 121-22. 
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It has been argued that this interpretation respects the purposes of the 
Supremacy Clause: “By making treaties the supreme law of the land and 
thereby giving individuals, including foreigners, the right to raise treaty rights 
in American courts, the Framers hoped to reduce potential conflict with the 
foreigners’ home countries.”253  The Cook holding prevented the development 
of this conflict by construing the treaty liberally.  Thus, although courts have 
used judicial restraint when foreign relations and politics are involved, Cook 
represents a case where the judiciary did not restrict itself. 
The United States government argues that to allow courts to decide cases 
involving customary international law: 
threaten[s] the fundamental constitutional principles that reserve to the 
political branches the authority to make judgments about how to conduct the 
Nation’s foreign affairs and that seek to ensure that the Nation speaks with one 
voice on such matters. . . . “Congress—not the Judiciary—is to determine, 
through legislation, what international law is and what violations of it ought to 
be cognizable in the courts.”254 
In short, the government contends that the Judicial Branch should not 
supervise the Executive Branch’s “conduct of foreign policy and law 
enforcement activities abroad,”255 and that it is not appropriate for the courts to 
provide a remedy that has not been authorized by the political branches.256 
Even if the President has the power to authorize violations of international 
law through his foreign affairs powers, lower-level executive officials do not 
have this authority.257  There is nothing in the record of Alvarez-Machain to 
show that the decision to abduct was approved by the President, Attorney 
General, or any other cabinet officer.258  Furthermore, 21 U.S.C. § 878(a) gives 
DEA agents the power to “make arrests without warrant . . . for any felony, 
cognizable under the laws of the United States” and to “perform such other law 
enforcement duties as the Attorney General may designate.”259  Thus, the 
express statutory language does not permit unauthorized extraterritorial arrests; 
rather, it refers to the Attorney General’s authority to designate such activities.  
 
 253. Thomas Michael McDonnell, Defensively Invoking Treaties in American Courts—
Jurisdictional Challenges Under the U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention by Foreign Defendants 
Kidnapped Abroad by U.S. Agents, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1401, 1445 (1996). 
 254. Brief for the United States at 10, 15, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 807 (2003) 
(No. 03-339) (quoting Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). 
 255. Petition of United States at 15, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 821 (2003) 
(No. 03-485). 
 256. Id.; Brief for the United States at 10, 15, Sosa (No. 03-339). 
 257. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1454-55 (11th Cir. 1986) (observing that the 
President can “disregard international law in service of domestic needs” and “‘act in ways that 
constitute violations of international law by the United States’”). 
 258. Brief for Alvarez-Machain at 5, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 821 (2003) 
(No. 03-485). 
 259. 21 U.S.C. § 878(a)(3), (5) (2000). 
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Because there is no evidence that the President, Attorney General or other 
cabinet-level official authorized the abduction, and because the statute does not 
provide low-level DEA officials with the power to authorize such an 
abduction, the judiciary does not need to limit its power to adjudicate the case. 
Furthermore, the political branches exercise more control over offensive 
remedies than defensive remedies.  When a right has been established, it is 
normally the decision of Congress whether to attach individual liability for 
violations.260  For example, when Congress enacted the Torture Victim 
Protection Act,261 it chose to increase the use of the federal court system for 
violations of international law by extending the right to sue for torture to 
citizens and aliens.262  Likewise, Congress could choose to preclude an ATCA 
or FTCA remedy for transborder abductions if they chose to do so, but it has 
not decided to do so.263  Even so, it is typically a decision of Congress to grant 
an offensive remedy and private damages, rather than the judiciary. 
If the established right does not contemplate private damages, “it would 
not be sound judicial policy to conjure a legal theory that would expose 
individual officers to liability for breaches of international treaties.”264  On the 
other hand, the Judicial Branch has historically played an active role in 
formulating defensive remedies, whereas the political branches have had little 
or no part in creating defensive remedies.265  The Supreme Court created the 
exclusionary rule and the political branches did not authorize this decision and, 
in fact, vehemently opposed it.266  The judiciary historically has not limited 
 
 260. United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 894-95 (9th Cir. 2000) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting).  Recognizing that the exclusionary rule is the only adequate and appropriate 
remedy for Vienna Convention violations, Judge Thomas reasoned that “[i]n fact, the only [other] 
options readily apparent are private damage actions . . . .  The decision on whether to attach 
individual liability for such violations should be left to Congress.”  Id. at 895. 
 261. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000) (Torture Victim Protection). 
 262. Id. 
 263. As Judge Walker commented, the ATCA: 
is simply an act of Congress.  If it raises valid policy concerns and if adjudication under it 
leads to real-world problems for the executive or the legislature, it may be amended, or 
even repealed.  The fact that Congress has not done so, and, indeed, appears to have 
endorsed the Filartiga approach in the legislative history of the Torture Victim Protection 
Act, indicates that the substantial concerns that have been voiced are, at least at this point, 
largely theoretical. 
Hon. John M. Walker, Jr., Domestic Adjudication of International Human Rights Violations 
Under the Alien Tort Statute, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 539, 560 (1997). 
 264. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 895 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 265. See supra notes 123-53 and accompanying text. 
 266. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650-53 (1961); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 
(1966); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 
323-24 (1959).  “The most elemental concepts of checks and balances and separation of powers 
explain why a branch of government that is found to act illegally should not have the ability to 
prevent a remedy for its own wrongful conduct.”  Brief for Alvarez-Machain at 46, United States 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] FORCIBLE TRANSBORDER ABDUCTION 1417 
itself when considering defensive remedies, where the opposite has been true 
regarding offensive remedies.  As such, the limits on judicial power support 
dismissal of the indictment over monetary damages because this is a remedy 
traditionally granted by the Judicial Branch and not by the other political 
branches. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
It is clear that transborder abductions violate a State’s territorial integrity, 
the abducted individual’s personal rights and liberty, and international law.  
The United States’ choice of an offensive remedy in place of a defensive 
remedy for transborder abductions is mistaken, as it was previously shown that 
a defensive remedy with or without monetary compensation can better 
accomplish policy objectives set out by various Supreme Court decisions.267  A 
defensive remedy, and more precisely dismissal of the indictment, upholds 
judicial integrity, deters government misconduct, and compensates the victim 
by re-establishing his liberty and personal rights.  The dismissal of the 
indictment would not undermine law enforcement efforts because extradition 
treaties are an efficient mechanism to detain a suspect, and it is within the 
judiciary’s powers to grant such a remedy.  Conversely, an offensive remedy, 
when not coupled with a defensive remedy, only compensates the victim 
monetarily.  Refusal to dismiss the indictment tends to promote lawless 
conduct and harms the integrity of the judicial system both within the United 
States and throughout the world. 
As such, the courts should not adhere to the flawed policy of the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine and should instead repatriate a victim of a transborder 
abduction.  Repatriation and dismissal of the indictment uphold the integrity 
and process of international law and further international cooperation in the 
apprehension of criminal suspects.  However, as the minority counsel of the 
 
v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. 2188 (1992) (No. 91-712).  In his dissent in Lombera-Camorlinga, 
Judge Thomas explained another reason why a court should not give deference to government 
positions when the government is a party to the case: “[government] positions developed in 
response to a lawsuit are not of the same character: they are specifically tailored to help obtain a 
favorable outcome in a pending controversy in which the agency is involved.”  Lombera-
Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 895 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 267. As Jorge Reinaldo A. Vanossi stated in the Inter-American Juridical Committee decision 
concerning Alvarez-Machain, 
[i]n the general order of life and, no less in the life of peoples, situations come up that are 
sometimes errors, sometimes misfortunes, and sometimes mysteries.  This being the case, 
errors must be corrected, misfortunes require our resignation to them, and mysteries must 
be explained.  The topic that concerns us today is neither a mystery nor a misfortune.  It is 
simply an error . . . . 
Legal Opinion on the Decision of the US Supreme Court in the Alvarez-Machain Case, CP Res. 
586, Inter-Am. Juridical Comm. Doc. CJI/RES.II-15/92 (Aug. 15, 1992), reprinted in 13 HUM. 
RTS. L.J. 395, 397 (1992) (explanation of concurring vote of Dr. Jorge Reinaldo A. Vanossi). 
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Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Robert Friedlander, commented, “‘it 
seems to be the practice of the United States to do what it wants to do; it has 
long been so and probably will continue to be so.’”268  Thus, until the Supreme 
Court is willing to overrule the Ker-Frisbie line of cases dealing with 
transborder abductions, it seems that the United States can and probably will 
continue to apprehend suspects through forcible transborder abductions.  
International law has evolved to no longer accept transborder abductions as a 
legitimate way to apprehend a suspect and has shown that jurisdiction should 
not be upheld in such a case.  Hopefully the United States’ courts will soon 
follow suit and require the dismissal of the indictment when a suspect has been 
forcibly abducted from another country. 
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